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A cross-disciplinary work to help organizational theorists and other social scientists 
to understand corporate governance theories from the legalists’ point of view is long 
overdue. The principal contribution of this research is plugging this lacuna in 
management literature. This dissertation consists of three essays that explore the 
theoretical application of legal theories and models of corporation and corporate 
governance and provide empirical evidence to the importance of litigation in 
corporate governance. Each essay constitutes a separate chapter.  
 
The first essay (Chapter 2) examines the major research trends in legal theories on 
corporation and corporate governance that are relevant to social scientists. It also 
explains how legal theories and models can contribute to management research, 
namely, pluralism, theory construction and hypotheses testing and sets out a 
framework for potential investigation in this area. 
 
The second essay (Chapter 3) further explores the relationship between law and 
corporate governance by introducing a new but compelling theory to explain the 
corporate governance structure of the firm drawn from legal literature. The team 
production theory proposed by Blair and Stout (1999) suggests that the corporate 
board of directors is a mediating hierarch and its role is to mediate conflicting 
interests and allocate the returns generated by corporate assets among corporate 
constituencies. The essay explores how this role of the board differs from the 
 xii
 monitoring role of the board posited under the traditional agency cost theory and 
proposes a model for the determinants of board effectiveness.  
 
The last essay (Chapter 4) fills a gap in empirical research concerning the role of 
litigation in corporate governance. While there has been research to look at the wealth 
effect and reduction of agency costs arising from civil lawsuits against the corporate 
boards for breach of their duties owed to the corporations, few studies have looked 
into the factors that can affect the outcome of the litigation. Chapter 4 is an empirical 
study that examines a sample of 185 US cases where the directors have been taken to 
court for breaches of duty to the corporation obtained from publicly available data 
over a ten-year period. The findings not only serve to corroborate previous studies but 









This chapter introduces the dissertation, summarizes the contributions and provides 
an organizing framework for the rest of the chapters. 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
Research on theories of corporate governance in management studies has come a long 
way. Ever since Berle and Mean published their seminal work, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, on the separation of ownership (shareholders) and 
control (management) in 1932, many schools of thought have sought to explain the 
board-shareholders’ accountability/monitoring relationship: agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997), resource dependence theory (Boyd, 1990; Daily & 
Dalton, 1994 a, b) and the stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1994; Turnbull, 1994) to 
name a few. These theories are generally rooted in economics and finance (agency 
theory) or sociology and organizational behavior (stewardship theory and resource 
dependence theory). As pointed out by Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) in their 
introduction to the special topic forum on corporate governance in the July 2003 issue 
of the Academy of Management Review, the overwhelmingly dominant theoretical 
perspective applied in corporate governance studies is still the agency cost theory 
proposed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and almost all the other theories are intended 






Recently, however, there is an increased interest in developing research in this area 
from other perspectives. This can be attributed to two reasons. First, extant empirical 
research has not conclusively supported the validity of agency cost theory and its 
related themes (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 
2003; Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999). Second, agency cost theory has 
been called the “pessimistic model of people as purely self-interested beings” that is 
“destroying good management practices” by the process of self-fulfilling prophecy 
(Ghoshal, 2005: 83-86). Therefore, there have been calls to dismantle the usual 
fortresses in corporate governance research (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003, 
Ghoshal, 2005) and to look beyond the established paradigm.  
 
One such source is in legal literature. While the discourse between legal academics 
and economists (and to some extent, finance theorists) in the area of corporate 
governance has been going on decades (see Bratton, 2001 for a historical account of 
the rise and fall of Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and control theory in 
legal literature), there is very little exchange between the legal scholars and 
researchers from other branches of social science such as organization theorists and 
strategists in this respect (Bainbridge, 2002c).  
 
Research work to help organizational theorists and other social scientists to 
understand corporate governance from the legalists’ point of view is long overdue. 
This dissertation consists of three essays that intend to fill this lacuna in corporate 





various aspects of how law impacts corporate governance and vice versa. The 
following sections provide a summary of the different chapters. 
 
1.1.1 Legal Theories and Models of Corporate Governance  
The first essay examines the legal foundation of corporate governance from historical 
and theoretical perspectives. It looks at how the legalists view corporation and 
explains the three dominant corporate theories accepted by legal scholars: the 
concession/fiction theory, the contractual/aggregate theory, and the realist/organic 
theory. From these theories, the essay traces how the four legal models of corporate 
governance generally advocated in the countries with the Anglo-Saxon legal system 
such as America, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada are developed. These 
models include the management-oriented model, the shareholder-oriented or 
shareholder supremacy model, the stakeholder-oriented or communitarian model and 
lastly, the director primacy model.  In the second part of the chapter, some 
implications of these legal theories and models to management research are explored. 
 
1.1.2 Board as Mediating Hierarch – Determinants of Board Effectiveness 
The second essay introduces a new but compelling theory to explain the corporate 
governance structure of the firm drawn from legal literature. The team production 
theory proposed by Blair and Stout (1999) suggests that the corporate board of 
directors is a mediating hierarch and its role is to mediate conflicting interests and 
allocate the returns generated by corporate assets among corporate constituencies. 





agency cost theory. Chapter 3 contrasts the team production theory and the agency 
cost theory and examines the different roles of the board under the two theories. In 
the second part of this chapter, a model for the determinants of an effective mediating 
board is constructed and testable propositions are proposed for future research in this 
area. This chapter suggests that board compensation, board composition and 
internalized trustworthiness are three important determinants for a mediating board to 
carry out its role effectively. 
 
1.1.3 Litigating Challenges to Directors’ Duties – An Empirical Analysis 
The last essay looks at civil lawsuits against the corporate boards for breach of their 
duties owed to the corporations. While there has been research to look at the wealth 
effect and reduction of agency costs arising from these litigations, few studies have 
looked into the factors that can affect the outcome of the litigation. This is important 
as litigation is generally costly and the beneficiary may not always be the corporation 
but the entrepreneurial lawyers. It is not a priori clear why some plaintiffs win the 
suits and others do not.  Chapter 4 comprises of an empirical study that examines a 
sample of 185 US cases where the directors have been taken to court for breaches of 
duty to the corporation obtained from publicly available data over a ten-year period. 
The data shows that the plaintiffs are successful under some circumstances in a 
significant percentage of these cases and the probability of success is dependent on 
some factors such as the nature of the corporation and whether the directors received 







The main contribution of this research is in its inter-disciplinary focus. By bridging 
legal and management literature, it aims to fill some conceptual and empirical gaps in 
corporate governance research. Chapters 2 and 3 provide alterative models and 
explanations on the roles of the various constituents in the corporation. It particular, 
Chapter 2 shows how legal models can help to corroborate, refine and challenge some 
existing management concepts on corporation and corporate governance. This will 
ensure that the management theories are both normatively and positively relevant. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the latest corporate governance model, the mediating hierarch 
board model, as a plausible alternative to the monitoring board model advocated 
under the agency theory. It also shows some of the determinants of an effective 
mediating board and proposes five sets of testable propositions. . 
  
The last chapter, Chapter 4, provides empirical evidence as to the factors that can 
affect the outcome of a lawsuit against the directors for breach of their duties to the 
corporation. It corroborates previous studies which show that litigation to enforce 
directors’ duties is not producing significant monetary benefits for shareholders and 
institutional investors of public corporations (Bhagat & Romano, 2002; Romano; 
1991). However, the present study also shows that the reverse can be said for the 
plaintiffs in cases concerning close corporations. It addition, the results of the study 
demonstrate that the chances of the plaintiff winning the case will increase 





underlying transaction. All these variables were previously unexplored in earlier 
studies. 
 
1.3 ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapters 2 to 4 present the three essays, 
each with introduction, review of the relevant literature, discussion and conclusion. 











LEGAL THEORIES AND MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
Research on corporate governance in management studies is generally dominated 
by theories rooted in economics and finance (agency theory) or sociology and 
organizational behavior (stewardship theory and resource dependence theory). 
Recently, however, there is an increased interest in developing research in this 
area from other perspectives (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, 
Certo & Roengpitya, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999). One 
possible source is in legal literature. While the discourse between legal academics 
and economists (and to some extent, finance theorists) in the area of corporate 
governance has been going on decades (see Bratton, 2001 for a historical account 
of the rise and fall of Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and control 
theory in legal literature), there is very little exchange between the legal scholars 
and researchers from other branches of social science such as organization 
theorists and strategists in this respect (Bainbridge, 2002a). This can be attributed 
to three reasons.  
 
First, the collaboration of Adolf Berle with Gardiner Means for the classic The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property was itself an “early exemplar of law 
and economics inquiry” (Bratton, 2001: 750). Back in 1927, Berle was teaching in 
Columbia Law School (and previously he had a temporary stint at the Business 
School) and he decided to pick Means, an economist, to join him in an 






Foundation grant. As Bratton (2001: 750) says, “There resulted a book reflecting 
the theoretical posture of the law and economics of the day.” Since then, the 
dialogue between legal theorists and economists on the topic has never ceased. 
Organization theorists and legalists on the other hand seldom have such 
opportunity of working closely together. 
 
Second, many top law schools have equally strong economics departments or 
economics emphasis in their law syllabus. For instance, the Chicago Law School 
is famous for its strength in economics theories. Similarly, Columbia Law School, 
Harvard Law School and Stanford Law School etc. have or have produced law 
professors such as Melvin Eisenberg, Bernard Black, John Coffee, etc. who have 
strong interest in trying to bridge legal theories in the area of corporate 
governance with economics or finance theories. They generally publish their 
findings in top law, finance or economics journals. Not many have ventured into 
the fields of sociology or organization behavior (with the possible exceptions of 
Lauren Edelman and Mark Suchman who are professors of sociology and law and 
Robert Clark and Robert Haft as mentioned by Bainbridge (2002a:5) in his 
footnotes). However, this may set to be changed with law researchers like 
Margaret Blair, Lynn Stout and Stephen Bainbridge finding their names being 
cited in management literature. 
 
Finally, lawyers and legal theorists speak and write in a language which few can 
understand. Many terms that lawyers consider ordinary parlance, such as proper 
plaintiff, corporate and personal rights, fiduciary duties etc., are themselves 






asked to explain. In addition, legal essays published in law journals are often very 
long, running up to forty to sixty pages. It takes a reader not only special training 
in law (or at least in the legal terminology) but also patience and stamina to be 
able to plough through them unscathed. 
 
The principal contribution of this chapter is plugging this lacuna in management 
literature by providing a platform for management researchers to gain a better 
understanding of the theories and models of corporate governance from a 
legalist’s perspective. The chapter begins by sketching out and explaining the 
major research trends in legal theories on corporation and corporate governance 
relevant to social scientists. Most of the legal research so far has been at the 
macro-level and centered upon the debates regarding the nature of corporation 
(Horwitz, 1985; Phillips, 1994) and the validity of the economists’ theory of the 
firm, i.e. the nexus of contract theory (Bainbridge, 1997; Branson, 1995; Bratton, 
1989a; Eisenberg, 1989, 1990; McChesney, 1989, 1990; Parkinson, 1993). It will 
be shown that the agency theory as known by the researchers in the management 
field has long been challenged or modified by the legal scholars. At the firm level, 
a number of models have been put forth as to the hierarchical arrangement of the 
various actors of the firm, namely, the shareholders, the management and the 
board over the decades (Bainbridge, 2002a; Frug, 1984; Hansmann & Kraakman, 
2001; Marris, 1964). Quite recently, some law professors have begun to dispute 
the shareholder supremacy model of the firm and proposed competing models to 
present what they consider a true picture of the modern day firm (Bainbridge, 







The second part of this chapter discusses the implication of legal theories of the 
firm and models of corporate governance on management research. This will help 
management researchers to see how legal theories may be used to support or 
dismantle certain “fortresses” (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003: 379). Hopefully, 
it will also provide a platform for legalists and management researchers to begin 
dialogue on this important topic. 
 
The last part of the chapter sets out the agenda for future research for both legal 
theorists and organizational theorists. The overall conclusion is that management 
research in corporate governance need not begin and end with agency theory and 
other accepted governance models. 
   
2.2   THE MAJOR RESEARCH TRENDS IN LEGAL THEORIES ON 
CORPORATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The research trends in legal theories on corporation and corporate governance are 
basically at two interconnected levels. The first level is at defining the very 
existence of a corporation and to answer the fundamental question: what is a 
corporation? This issue has troubled legal scholars ever since the conception of 
the corporation as a business form in the nineteenth century (Phillips, 1994). The 
arrival of the economists’ nexus of contract theory brought the debate to a new 
level.  
 
The concern at the second level is to determine the best legal model describing the 
corporate governance structure of a corporation. These two levels are linked as the 






nature of the corporation to be. While the investigations at the second level may 
appeal more to organization theorists and strategists, the legal theories of the 
corporation are important to management studies for a few reasons.  
 
First, the legal theories can be used to legitimatize (Horwitz, 1985) or criticize 
particular corporate governance doctrines. As Millon argues, legal theories differ 
from legal rules because legal theories “set forth a positive or descriptive assertion 
about the world – an assertion about what corporations are.” (1990: 241). Once 
positive assertions are made, normative (as contrast with descriptive: Booth, 2001) 
implications and rules can then flow from them.  
 
Second, legal theories have determinate (Horwitz, 1985, c.f. Millon, 1990) or 
predictive (Booth, 2001) significance because a certain theory has a generally 
accepted meaning that embraces some implications and excludes the rest (Millon, 
1990). For instance, the concession theory is often used to explain the legitimacy 
of governmental intervention to protect shareholders (Bratton, 1989a). Third, the 
relationship between legal theories and corporate doctrine is not stagnant and each 
has a molding effect on the other (Millon, 1990). With each fall and subsequent 
revival in interest in them, the theories are fine-tuned with new facets being added 
to them. For instance, the contractual theory of the firm exists in legal literature 
long before the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
wrote their seminal papers on the nexus of contract theory. However, it cannot be 
denied that the term “agency costs” is added to the legal scholar’s dictionary only 






Finally, the legal theories are often broad-based and malleable; leaving a great 
deal of room for the creative deployment of rhetoric and political vision to flesh 
out the actual and potential content of corporate governance framework. For 
example, the contractual or aggregate theory is often cited to counter the 
management-oriented model of the firm that the management is mere agent of the 
shareholders and the latter has ultimate power of control over the management as 
principals (Bratton, 1989b; Hager, 1989; Phillips, 1994). On the other hand, the 
theory also assumes that the management will bear the costs of its own 
misconduct and has an incentive to discipline its own behavior (Fischel, 1982) and 
so the corporation is a “private” phenomenon. This supports the pro-managerialist 
stance of minimal government intrusion into the affairs of the corporation. It is not 
surprising that the contractual theory, especially the version proposed by the 
institutionalists, was initially developed to support managerialism rather than to 
oppose it (Bratton, 1989b:1500).  
 
Figure 2-1 below summaries how the various legal theories of the corporation are 














Figure 2-1 Relationship between the Legal Theories of the Corporation 
















Theories of the Corporation
Models of Corporate Governance 
 
2.2.1 The Theories of the Corporation 
A theory of the corporation has been defined as “an attempt to abstractly define 
the firm’s nature or essence” (Phillips, 1994: 1063; emphasis mine). It is abstract 
in a sense as its validity cannot be proven empirically. One of the key features of 
the corporation is that upon incorporation, the corporation acquires a legal 
personality separate and distinct from the people who have invested and hold 
shares in it and the people who manage it. The corporation can hold property in its 
name, be sued and take part in legal suits, and it continues to exist even though the 
shareholders, directors and managers may come and go (Farrar, 1998; Palmiter, 
2003). As Mark (1987) writes, this personification of corporation has great 






over the collective property of the various participants of a corporation, (2) it 
defines, encourages and legitimates the corporation as an autonomous, creative, 
self-directed economic being, and (3) captures rights, including constitutional 
rights, for corporations thereby giving corporate property unprecedented 
protection from the state just like natural person. 
 
To explain this personification phenomenon, there are generally three dominant 
corporate theories put forth: the concession/fiction theory, the 
contractual/aggregate theory, and the realist/organic theory (Bratton, 1989a and b; 
Phillips, 1994). These treat the corporation as an artificial entity created by the 
state, as an aggregate of persons bound by contracts, and as a real entity existing 
naturally respectively (Schane, 1987; Stokes, 1986). The historical development 
and legal groundings of these theories have been detailed in previous research (e.g. 
Bratton, 1989b; Horwitz, 1985) and will not be repeated here. Instead, this section 
intends to give a brief description of the three theories, noting the subtle changes 
of each theory at various points in time. 
 
The Corporation as an artificial creation of the law – the Concession/Fiction 
Theory 
According to this theory, a corporation is a state-created reification (Bratton, 
1989b). The corporation is a fiction because its life is derived from the state and 
the latter concedes to it the special privileges of entity status, perpetual existence 
and limited liability. In return, the corporate owed services to the public good and 
the state must regulate corporations to enforce this obligation to reciprocate 






the nineteenth century especially after the 1819 landmark decision of  Dartmouth 
College v Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (Mark, 1987). In that case, the then 
Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court held that  a corporation was an artificial 
person that owed its existence more to government than to its incorporators, and 
as a creature of positive law, had only the rights and privileges that obtained from 
the government’s grant (17 U.S. 518, 636). 
 
It was justifiable since corporation as a business form at that time was not freely 
accessible to everybody but each corporation was created by a specific legislative 
grant, with its powers and purposes strictly limited by its charter of incorporation 
(Horwitz, 1985; Mark, 1987; Phillips, 1994). However, when each state started to 
have its own general incorporation law and all and sundry could make use of the 
corporate form, the concession part of the theory lost favor with legal theorists 
(Phillips, 1994). The modified version of this theory sets up state permission as a 
regulatory prerequisite to doing business (Bratton, 1989b). The key idea that the 
corporation is a public social creature still remains.  
 
The theory supports the idea of state encroachments into business activities. In 
particular, it lends support to legal scholars who believe that management or for 
that matter, any corporate organ should not have a dominating power in the 
corporation. It is argued that because the actions of large corporations have wide 
ramification on the society, their “public-nature” justify the state to impose 
regulations on managers  in their exercise of power in the interests of investors 






government agency (Latham, 1959; Nader, Green, & Seligman, 1976). In this way, 
corporate law is like constitutional or administrative law (Eisenberg, 1976).  
 
This theory naturally does not go down well with contractarians who take a very 
mechanical view of corporation as nothing more than a bundle of contract and 
agency relationships amongst private individuals without the involvement of the 
state. The theory also does not well with legal scholars who support the view that 
there should be a centralized group with largely unfettered authority in the 
corporation to act as its strategic center in order for it to function efficiently. 
 
The concession theory finally faded out of fashion when it was clear from the 
legal literature in the last two decades (e.g. Bratton, 1989a, b; Phillips, 1994) that 
the other two theories, the contractual/ aggregation and the realist/organic theory 
were the preferred theories. However, in the last decade, the concession theory has 
been said to be reinvigorated with the rise of the communitarian model of 
corporation which generally takes a public view of corporate law and advocates 
for the protection of the stakeholders’ interests rather than mere shareholders’ 
interests (DeBow & Lee, 1993). 
 
The Corporation as an aggregation of contractual relationships – the 
Contractual/ Aggregation Theory 
Like the concession/fiction theory of the corporation, the growth of the 
contractual/ aggregation theory has also undergone two phases. Long before the 
neoclassical economists came up with their “revolution(ary)” (Jensen, 1983: 324) 






Victor Morawetz (1886) and Henry Taylor (1902) already used partnership 
analogies to describe the corporation (Bratton, 1989b) and characterizing it as an 
aggregate (Beach, 1891; Morawetz, 1886; Taylor, 1902) formed by voluntary 
private contracting among its human parts (Phillips, 1994). A corporate “whole” is 
nothing more than the additive sum of its “parts” (Hager, 1989), which consist 
basically of the shareholders (Horwitz, 1985) and the directors and officers 
(Hessen, 1979). There is no distinct corporate entity (Bratton, 1989b; Phillips, 
1994). The key feature of the corporation under this theory is that it emphasizes 
individualism (Bratton, 1989b) and plays down communitarian characteristics of 
the corporation.  
 
The early supporters of this contractual/ aggregate theory of the firm faced two 
conceptual problems. First, there is an important difference between the nature of 
a partnership and that of a corporation. As an unincorporated entity, the 
partnership law does not distinguish the partners from the partnership in terms of 
risk bearing. However, the personification of a firm upon incorporation is crucial 
as it recognizes that the firm or corporation can bear its own risk, a concept absent 
under partnership law (Horwitz, 1985). Second, the simple contractual theory was 
unable to explain the development of large publicly owned enterprises where it 
was becoming clear that management, not individual shareholders, were the real 
decision-makers (Phillips, 1994). This second point was particularly important as 
it subsequently gave rise to the use of organic theory to explain the nature of the 
firm at the turn of the twentieth century. The contractual/aggregate theory was 







The contractual/aggregate theory was given a new lease of life in legal literature 
with the rise of the new economic theory in the 1970s. At that time, the pro-
manageralists were largely relying on the organic theory to support a 
management-centered governance structure. The anti-managerialists who believed 
that corporate power should not be concentrated in the management’s hands but 
should be returned to the shareholders were glad to find a weighty competing 
theory to rival the organic theory (e.g. see Fischel, 1982; Kraakman, 1984; Scott, 
1983). This also spelt the beginning of the infiltration of the economic theories 
into legal literature.  
 
Like its predecessor, under the revised contractual/aggregate theory, the 
corporation is nothing more than a “mental construct” (Hessen, 1979: 41) of 
humans connected with the firm or otherwise aware of it (Bratton, 1989a). In 
another words, the firm is a “legal fiction” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 – not to be 
confused with the proposition in the concession/fiction theory) that serves as a 
nexus for the contracting process involving the various factors of production in the 
firm. Two variants of the new economic theory appear: the neoclassical approach 
advocated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
the institutional approach taken by Williamson (1985). The neoclassicists view the 
firm as without hierarchies, being “no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary 
action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting 
between any two people” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 777). The relationship 
between the shareholders and the managers was governed by contract similar to 
the principal-agent relationship with the main, if not sole, purpose of maximizing 






continuous process of negotiation of successive contracts with the shareholders. 
The dissatisfied party can always terminate the contract (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972). However, since economic actors are all self-interested and all delegations 
involve costs of shirking or agency costs, firm contracts take forms determined by 
the imperative of reducing agency costs (Bratton, 1989a).  
 
On the other hand, the institutionalists do not dispute the existence of a 
hierarchical structure within the firm but consider the firm a single maximizing 
unit different from market contracting (Macneil, 1980; Spence, 1975; Williamson, 
1985). Nevertheless, the firm is still viewed as a construct of contract and is 
considered as a mitigating transactional structure preferred over market exchanges 
to guard against appropriation by parties engaging in opportunism (Williamson, 
1985). Nonetheless, the two variants share a common aim, i.e. to reduce agency 
costs and maximize shareholders’ wealth. Shareholders are viewed as the supreme 
corporate body under the theory. Some of the legal scholars who strongly support 
the nexus of contract theory are Coffee (1999), Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), 
Hessen (1979) and Scott (1983). 
 
However, while the nexus of contract theory with its related agency cost theory 
have achieved wide currency outside its original economics context and in 
particular in management studies (Eisenhardt, 1989), not all legal scholars accept 
them (Eisenberg, 1989; Horwitz, 1985; Iwai, 1999; Phillips, 1994). Even scholars 
who accept the overall relevance of the theory to corporate law have challenged 
specific points regarding the theory (Bratton, 1989a, b). The main criticism hurled 






term “contract” in the eyes of the law. In law, the term “contract” means a legally 
enforceable promise. However, as Eisenberg points out, the nexus of contracts 
conception means more than just that the corporation is a nexus of legally 
enforceable promises but a nexus of reciprocal arrangements (Eisenberg, 1999a: 
822). The difference is not merely in semantics.  
 
Another criticism is its detachment from the reality of corporate law. For instance, 
the theory, especially the neoclassical variant, abrogates the separate legal 
personality of the corporation, which is the crux of corporate law (Iwai, 1999). 
The corporation, and not the individual shareholders, is liable for its debts. The 
board of directors is answerable to the corporation, and not to the individual 
shareholders, for its actions. The theory also renders corporate law redundant 
since all relationships can be explained away using contract theory (“contract was 
once the greediest of legal categories intent on devouring as many areas of the law 
as possible” (Stokes, 1986:89)) and corporate law is merely “symbolic” (Bratton, 
1989a:445) or serves only as "a set of terms available off-the-rack so that 
participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting” (Easterbrook & 
Fischel, 1991: 34). As vehemently put forth by Bratton (1989a & b) and many 
other legal theorists who oppose the applying of the simple nexus of contract 
theory to corporation (e.g. Klausner, 1995; Phillips, 1994), the new economic 
theory’s contractual perspective of corporations lacks the “richness” (Bratton, 
1989a: 411) embodied in corporate law which is more complex and relational. 
Further, being “private” (Bratton, 1989a: 414) and entirely voluntary in nature, the 
theory actually rejects state’s interference and protection of shareholders (Bratton, 






imposed on the various corporate constituents on public policy grounds which 
cannot be freely contracted out (Eisenberg, 1989; Millon, 1990).  
 
Finally, the single-mindedness of the theory on shareholders’ wealth 
maximization makes it unpopular with scholars who would like to see the firm 
encompassing a wider role with social-policy objectives (Millon, 1995; Mitchell, 
1992a; Parkinson, 1993).  
 
Recently, there is a resurgence of this theory in legal literature to support a new 
model of corporate governance based on director primacy. Stephen Bainbridge 
(2002b, c and d) relies on the institutionalist variant of the nexus of contract to 
argue that fiat is an essential attribute of the firm (2002c:200-203) and the nexus is 
not the firm but the board of directors (2002c:203-204). Although the director 
primacy theory and its related arguments have their merits and it is a strong 
contender as a framework for the modern corporate governance structure, it is 
debatable whether the adoption of contractual foundation is a wise decision 
(Millon, 2000). 
 
The Corporation as a real, naturally occurring being – the Realist/Organic 
Theory 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the “natural entity” theory or “group person” 
theory of the firm initially proposed by the German and French realists such as 
Savigny, Ihering, Vareilles-Sommieres, Gierke in the nineteenth century found its 
way into the legal literature (e.g. Canfield, 1917; Dicey, 1905; Freund, 1897; 






1986; Phillips, 1994). This was done essentially through Frederick Maitland’s first 
English translation in 1900 of Otto Gierke’s great historical studies on the 
corporate legal theory of the German Middle Ages (Maitland, 1927; Hager, 1989).  
 
Under this theory, the corporation is a real or natural entity which has an existence 
separate from the shareholders. This creature called “corporation” in turn is 
capable of willing and acting through the groups of individuals who are its organs, 
just like a natural person willing and acting through his brain, mouth and hands 
(Stokes, 1986). The theory which postulates that the corporation is a separate 
creature in its own right and distinct from its shareholders, directors and officers 
falls in squarely with the legal separate entity concept.  
 
The key feature of this theory is that it recognizes that the different corporate 
constituents have different roles and functions. By drawing analogy with a living 
creature, it also postulates the existence of a centralized decision-making organ, 
much like the brain of a human. The problem is locating this “brain” in the 
corporation. As mentioned earlier, at the turn of the twentieth century when it was 
clear that the management, rather than the passive shareholders or the rubber-
stamping directors, was the real decision makers of the firm, it was said that the 
management was the “brain” of the corporation-creature. With their specialized 
skills, expertise, time and resources, they are able to “think” or formulate 
corporate policies and to direct the implementation of these policies by the 
corporate executives and managers (Frug, 1984). Therefore, they should be 
empowered and given largely unfettered authority to run the firm. Subsequently, 






decision-making, there is a shift in focus to the board as the “brain” of the 
corporation.  
 
The fact that it is not a creation of the state but rather is conceived from the free 
will of individuals bound together by a common goal to pursue wealth also fits in 
well with the capitalists’ idea of modern corporation. At the same time, being a 
social entity where its activities are socially significant, it justified state’s 
regulation of its affairs where it affects the society (Hager, 1989) but leaving the 
internal activities of the corporate actors to self-regulation (Bratton, 1989a), very 
much like the natural immunity system of a living organism.  Most importantly, as 
explained by Stokes (1986), is that this theory overcomes the problems of the 
artificiality of analyzing the directors’ managerial power as being derived from 
the contractual agreement of the shareholders, which is very difficult to justify 
especially in the case of large corporations where shareholders are largely passive. 
As described by the former dean of Harvard Law School Professor Roscoe Pound, 
the key point about legal realism is its “fidelity to nature, accurate recordings of 
things as they are, as contrasted with thoughts as they are imagined to be, or 
wished to be, or as one feels they ought to be” (Pound, 1931: 59). 
 
The organic theory had its early supporters (e.g. Canfield, 1917; Dicey, 1905; 
Freund, 1897; Laski, 1916) but also attracted opponents (e.g. Dewey, 1926; Radin, 
1932; Vinogradoff, 1924). Nonetheless, it has never been disproved. In particular, 
when the management-oriented model of the firm lost favor with the theorists and 
the economists’ nexus of contract theory began to dominate the discourse 






rather than being proven doctrinally unsuitable. Another reason for it being 
dropped from legal discourse is that researchers, especially the American legalists, 
generally are uncomfortable with theories that accord the group intrinsic primacy 
over the individual (Bratton, 1989b:1512). 
 
However, as Bratton (1989b) points out, the organicist rhetoric never disappears 
entirely (1989b:fn195) and he cites Williamson, a well-know institutionalist, for 
using words like “mitosis” and “quasi-biological” in the latter’s description of the 
contemporary corporate restructuring movement (Williamson, 1988:86). With the 
resurgence of the discussion on the contractual theory of the firm in the last two 
decades, the organic theory has been brought up again as a forceful alternative to 
explain the corporation in the eyes of the law (e.g. Hager, 1989; Horwitz, 1985; 
Schane, 1987; Phillips, 1994; Iwai, 1999).  
 
Table 2-1 below summarizes the three theories of the corporation.  
 
Table 2-1 Overview of the Legal Theories of the Corporation 






Definition Corporation is only a 
state-created reification 
and a legal fiction 
Corporation is formed by 
voluntary private 
contracting among its 
human parts and it is the 
sum of its human 
constituents and nothing 
more; no distinct corporate 
entity 
The corporation is a 
real entity which has an 
existence separate from 
the shareholders; it is 
capable of willing and 
acting through the 
groups of individuals 
who are its organs, just 
like a natural person 
willing and acting 
through his brain, 
mouth and hands 
 
Timeline Stage 1: First part of 19th 
Century until 1880s 
 
Stage 1: 1886 – 1890 
 
 








Stage 2: 1959 – 1970s 
 
Stage 3: 1990s till now 
 
Stage 2: 1979 till now 
 





Stage 1: Chief Justice 
Marshall, Associate 
Justices Washington and 
Story in Dartmouth 
College decision (1819). 
 
Stage 2:  Latham (1959); 
Nader, Green, & 
Seligman (1976) 
 
Stage 3: Millon (1990) 
 
Stage 1: Morawetz (1886); 





Stage 2: Hessen (1979); 
Fischel (1982); Kraakman 
(1984) Scott (1983); 
Coffee (1999) Hansmann 
& Kraakman (2001) 
Stage 1: Freund (1897);  
Maitland (1927); Laski 
(1916); Canfield (1917) 
 
 
Stage 2: Horwitz 
(1985); Hager (1989); 
Phillips (1994); Iwai 




Its life is derived from 
the state; the firm 
concedes to doing public 
good and subject itself to 
law in return  
 
It has no definite existence; 
merely a collective term for 
contracts entered into by 
corporate constituents 
 
It is a naturally 
occurring being; a full-




Law creates corporation 
and the charter 
determines its properties 
Law has little function and 
legal rules merely spell out 
what the human aggregates 
would have agreed in the 
first place 
 
Law does not create 










Justified, as corporation 
is a legal creation 
Not justified as state should 
not have any interest in 
contracts between private 
individuals; disciplinary 
actions should be taken by 
the market rather than by 
the state 
Justified, as corporation 
is a social being 
Influence on 
Legal Model 
of the firm 
-- Communitarian model -- Shareholder supremacy 
model 
-- Director primacy model 





2.2.2 The Models of Corporate Governance 
The models of corporate governance propounded by the legal theorists are largely 
dependent upon the latter’s perception of corporation. However, some scholars 
have deductively rehashed the various theories of the corporation in different 
ways to support their models. There are generally four legal models generally 
advocated in the countries with the Anglo-Saxon legal system such as America, 






oriented model, shareholder-oriented or shareholder supremacy model, 
stakeholder-oriented or communitarian model and lastly, director primacy model. 
Other models, such as the labor-oriented model and the state-oriented model more 
common with the countries in Europe and in Japan have been discussed elsewhere 
(Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001) and will not be covered in this dissertation. 
     
Managerialism 
When the discourse on the legal theories of the corporation ended the first round 
in about 1930 (Bratton, 1989a, b; Phillips, 1994), legal scholars turned to discuss 
the hierarchical allocation of power within firms, especially in large corporations. 
At that time, the dominant theory of the firm was the organic theory of the firm 
(Bratton, 1989b). Scholars generally saw the corporation as a living creature with 
hierarchical structure (Bratton, 1989b). The question was who should be on top of 
the structure. The managerialists depicted a picture with the management as the 
corporate strategic center or the “brain” in a bureaucratic hierarchy (Freund, 1928; 
Horwitz, 1985). Directors were figureheads, while shareholders were nonentities 
(Bainbridge, 2002c).  
 
Frug (1984) in his critique of the management-oriented model, summarized four 
types of corporate bureaucratic legitimacy that were put forth by its proponents: 
the formalist model (Freund, 1928), the expertise model (Landis, 1938), the 
judicial review model (Jaffe, 1965) and the market/pluralist model.  
 
In essence, the managerialists felt that corporate bureaucracy was a rationalized, 






objective implementation of the wishes of the stockholders. Like the “brain” of 
the creature, the rationalized and self-disciplined management was to work for the 
well-being of the corporation-creature. The management should therefore be 
granted unfettered power with little interference from the shareholders and the 
courts. The role of corporate governance under this model was to devise a 
structure that would confer enormous range of discretion upon the management so 
as not to curb the creativity and flexibility necessary for running an effective 
corporation (Frug, 1984). There would be no fear of abuse of managerial power 
because the statesmanship and professionalism of the management would 
simultaneously limit the scope of their power. Drawing an organic analogy, no 
living creature in its right mind would hurt any of its limbs. While its internal 
activities should be largely left to self-regulation, state’s regulation under the 
model was justified when its affairs affected the society at large (Hager, 1989), for 
instance, in insider’s trading or securities fraud. 
 
The state corporate law at that time generally supported this pro-managerialist 
stance (Bratton, 1989a) and the famous business judgment rule is an example. 
However, as explained by Hansmann & Kraakman (2001), the normative appeal 
of the management-oriented model of the firm eventually fell with the collapse of 
the conglomerate movement in the 1970s and 1980s. The persuasive new 
economic theory that has begun to take foot in 1970s also shows that while the 
managerial firms may be in some ways efficient, the price to be paid when giving 
managers with divergent self-interests uncontrolled discretion over investment 









The shareholder supremacy corporate governance structure is now the prevailing 
model (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001).  Although it is debatable whether there is 
or going to be a global convergence in corporate governance structure in the style 
of the American model (e.g. Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, 2001 c.f. Bainbridge, 2002d; Branson, 2001), this is the model that is 
currently being adopted in most common law countries such as America, United 
Kingdom and Australia (Coffee, 1999). 
 
The contractual theory has often been cited to support this model (Phillips, 1994). 
Since the firm is made up of contracts, the shareholders as the principals of the 
contracts should have the ultimate control over the corporation. Although under 
the neoclassical theory, the shareholders are not considered as “owners” of the 
corporation but rather one among the various suppliers of “inputs” (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972: 778, 791-93), they are the ones who delegate control of the firm 
to the agent-managers and will need to bear the costs associated with the risk that 
managers will fail to act in ways that maximize shareholder financial interests as 
residual claimants of the firm. The management of the corporation employed by 
the shareholders under contract is not in a privileged role and as agents should be 
made accountable to the shareholders. The consequence of this arrangement is that 
the sole purpose of the management is to maximize shareholders’ wealth, the 
latter being the residual claimants of the firm’s income stream. The management 
therefore should not engage in activities that are not financially beneficial to 






There is judicial endorsement of this model of corporate governance. As early as 
1919 the Supreme Court of Michigan state has already formulated the principle 
that the management must conduct corporate affairs for the benefit of the 
shareholders and not for other non-shareholder concerns in the landmark decision 
of Dodge v Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In that case, the court 
rejected Ford Motor’s excuse of not paying a special $10 million dividend to the 
shareholders that he intended to use the money to “employ still more men, to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible, to help them 
build up their lives and their homes” (170 N.W. 668: 671). The judge, Ostrander J., 
lashed out at Henry Ford for wanting to run the firm like a “semi-eleemosynary 
institution and not as a business institution” (170 N.W. 668: 683) and said at page 
684: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote 
them to other purposes. 
 
The role of corporate governance under this model is to devise a structure that will 
create incentives to minimize the agency costs and maximize shareholders’ wealth. 
The primary function of the board is to monitor the self-interested actions of the 
professional managers but the real control still lies with the shareholders 






only focus on the welfare of shareholders (Millon, 1990). Other corporate 
constituencies, such as creditors, consumers, employees and suppliers etc, should 
look outside of the corporate governance framework for the protection of their 
interests, e.g. in contract or statutes protecting employees or consumers 
(Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001).  
 
Another tenet in the shareholder supremacy model is that the law must protect all 
shareholders equally and minority shareholders should be guarded from 
exploitation by the majority shareholders. The law that gives less than optimal 
protection to shareholders’ interest will be phased out as shareholders will cause 
the corporation to reincorporate in another state that offer the shareholders better 
protection according to the economic theory of market forces (Millon, 1990, 
Winter, 1977). Therefore, laws concerning shareholder voting rights, fiduciary 
duties of the directors and management, derivative actions etc. should be 
strengthened in favor of the shareholders according to this argument.  
 
Whether the shareholder supremacy model truly represents the state of corporate 
governance in most American and United Kingdom firms has been questioned 
(Bainbridge, 2002d; Stout, 2002). The main point for contest is that implicit in the 
shareholder supremacy model is that the ultimate power of control over the 
corporation’s assets and outputs should lie with the shareholders. The 
shareholders are the principals on whose behalf the corporate governance structure 
is organized and they should be able to dictate how the firm should be run. 
However, this is not the case in theory and in practice (Stout, 2002). As pointed 






dispersed shareholding are generally passive, the situation today stays very much 
the same after more than 70 years. At the very least, the corporate law of most 
Anglo-Saxon countries still confers complete management power in the hands of 
the directors (Ferran, 1999; Palmiter, 2003; Welling, 1991; Woon, 1997). 
Although the law allows shareholders to reserve control of the firm in their hands 
by changing the corporate charters or constitutive documents of the firm, most 
corporations, at least the public corporations do not.  
 
In addition, the laws concerning shareholder voting power and derivative actions 
remain weak that they offer little protection for the shareholders to wield real 
control over the firm. These phenomena have prompted a number of legal scholars 
to look outside the “standard model” (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001) of corporate 
governance for a satisfactory answer. 
 
Stakeholder/Communitarian Model 
As Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) and other contractarians admit, the 
stakeholder or communitarian model that has been developing for the past decade 
provides a normatively attractive alternative to the shareholder supremacy model 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001:447 c.f. Bainbridge, 1997). The model is 
promulgated by a group of legal scholars who “share a belief that the liberal 
theories that have dominated English-speaking politics for centuries place too 
much emphasis on individual rights and not enough on community needs and 
civic obligations” (DeBow & Lee, 1993:fn 17; Winkler, 1992). As Dallas points 
out, the theories supporting the communitarian model generally rely on two 






corporation which are equally important as those of the shareholders; and that the 
stakes of nonshareholder constituencies justify a change in the governance 
structure of the corporation (Dallas, 1995: 49). The communitarians accept the 
corporation as a distinct legal entity but regard it as a social being not different 
from a person living in a community (Johnson, 1990; Millon, 1993; Mitchell, 
1992a). In the eyes of a communitarian, the corporations are “powerful 
institutions whose conduct has substantial public implications” (Millon, 1993: 
1379). Corporate law should also take into account social costs and emphasize on 
the social identity human being experiences such as empathy, solidarity, trust, 
integrity and identity (Callahan, Dworkin, Fort & Schipani, 2002; Fort & Schipani, 
2000; Mitchell, 1995). The communitarians therefore blend concepts taken from 
the concession theory (Millon, 1993) and the organic theory (Mitchell, 1992a) to 
define their firm.  
 
Like the contractarians, the communitarians do not think that the shareholders 
own the corporation (Eisenberg, 1999a). Accordingly, a corporation has 
responsibilities beyond those owed to its shareholders. Corporate actors who are 
fiduciaries of the firm, should consider the interests of a broad range of 
stakeholders, e.g. employees, creditors, customers, local communities etc. in their 
decisionmaking (Dallas, 1995) and prevent these stakeholders from exploitation 
by the firm. The corporate actor will have to act in the best interest of the 
corporation – which the communitarians have interpreted to be all corporate 
constituents affected by the corporation -- because the law mandates him to do so 
as a fiduciary.  Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) term this the “fiduciary” variant 






The communitarians find legal support in the constituency statutes passed in many 
states in the late 1980s that allow management to consider the interest of 
nonshareholder constituents in addition to those of shareholders, particular in a 
takeover offer (Johnson & Millon, 1989; Mitchell, 1992b). Some have argued that 
the effect of these statutes extend beyond the takeover situation (Bamonte, 1995; 
Millon, 1993).  
 
The other variant of the communitarian model identified by Hansmann and 
Kraakman is the “representative” variant (2001:448) that advocates for the 
appointment of the representatives of the various stakeholder groups to the board 
of directors. The representatives will then “elaborate policies that maximize the 
joint welfare of all stakeholders, subject to the bargaining leverage that each group 
brings to the boardroom table” (2001:448).  
 
However, the communitarian model has its weaknesses as pointed out by many 
scholars (e.g. Bainbridge, 1997; Callahan, Dworkin, Fort & Schipani, 2002; Fort 
& Schipani, 2000; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). By bringing back the 
concession argument to support interference by the state, the communitarian is 
treading on a ground which has long been rejected by modern corporate legal 
scholarship that incorporation requires some special state recognition or that state 
intrusion into the private sphere of the citizens can be justified in the name of 
some communal good (Bainbridge, 1997). In addition, the inclusion of many 
parties with disparate interests on the board (the “representative variant”) will 
likely impair corporate decisionmaking processes (Hansmann and Kraakman, 






interests simultaneously (the “fiduciary variant”) will find themselves end up 
protecting none as there are just no clear guidelines nor a system of prioritization 
to help these managers how to make choices among competing interests (Callahan, 
Dworkin, Fort & Schipani, 2002).  
 
Director Primacy 
In her paper on investors in public corporation, Professor Lynn Stout (2003) made 
an interesting observation that contrary to popular belief that shareholders are the 
victims of opportunistic executives who seek to maximize their self-interests with 
the inputs supplied by the shareholders, a picture painted by the shareholder 
supremacy model and the nexus of contract theory which supports it, shareholders 
can be the exploiters of corporate inputs as well (2003:677). In particular, she 
hypothesizes that the relationship between the shareholders and the directors in a 
public corporation is not one of involuntary reliance on the latter for want of a 
better alternative model to exercise control, but a voluntary relinquishing of power 
so that the shareholders may benefit from ceding control over their investments to 
the board of directors. She likens the situation to the Roman mythology of Ulysses 
(the equivalent of Greek Odysseus): “[j]ust as the legendary Ulysses served his 
own interests by binding himself to the mast of his ship, investors may be serving 
their own interests by binding themselves to boards” (2003:669). For the last four 
years, she and a few other law professors such as Margaret Blair and Stephen 
Bainbridge have been arguing that the present shareholder supremacy model is 
faulty (Stout, 2002 and 2003) and empirical evidence has not conclusively proven 






d; Blair & Stout, 2001a; Stout, 2002 and 2003) a new positive model of corporate 
governance focusing on directors.  
 
Although their models are slightly different as it will be pointed out in the later 
part of this chapter, they generally have the same theme, i.e. the board of directors 
should be the supreme structure in a corporation. Therefore, they will be discussed 
together. Summarizing their case, what they have proposed can be termed the 
director primacy model (Bainbridge, 2002b; Stout, 2002:1199) of corporate 
governance where the board of director is the central decision maker for the firm 
(Bainbridge, 2002c:204) and plays a mediating role (the “mediating hierarchs”, 
Blair & Stout, 2001:404) among the various groups that bear residual risk and 
have residual claims on the firm in the event that involves a conflict between 
corporate constituents (Stout, 2002 and 2003). Although they are not the first to 
challenge the shareholder supremacy model, they are probably the first few to do 
so relying primarily on economic and legal arguments alone (Millon, 2000). 
 
 The legal arguments address some of the problems faced by the shareholder 
supremacy model. In the director primacy model, a distinction is made between 
management and the board of directors and directors are correctly placed as 
autonomous fiduciaries and not ‘agents” – an issue which many legal scholars 
have been very sore about (Clark, 1985; Ferran, 1999). It also offers some 
explanation to the wide discretion that the law offers to directors, the restricted 
right of shareholders to bring derivative suits and the limited role played by 
shareholder voting (Bainbridge, 2002d; Blair & Stout, 2001a). As Millon points 






ineffective when it comes to rendering management accountable to the 
shareholders. This doctrinal inefficacy can be argued to reflect a commitment to 
director discretion and supporting the team production model (Million, 2000). 
This claim of doctrinal inefficacy is not without merit. As the result of the 
empirical study in Chapter 4 shows, the probability of a plaintiff in a public 
corporation of winning a law suit brought to enforce breaches of director’s duties 
against a director is generally very low, supporting the view that it is difficult to 
make directors accountable to shareholders in a public corporation. Similar 
conclusion can also be drawn from the early English and US cases dealing with 
the power of boards of directors to manage corporations. Despite the wording of 
the standard articles of association or corporate charters that generally suggested 
shareholder primacy over the board, a line of cases refused to allow shareholder to 
overrule board decisions on management matters. This is evidence to show that 
the common law courts instinctively supported a centralization of power within 
the board from a fairly early stage in the life of the modern corporation. 
 
While the legal arguments are consistent, there appears to be two variants with 
respect to the economic analysis: one based on the traditional nexus of contract 
theory and the other on an increasingly popular economic theory called the team 
production theory (Alchian & Demsetz 1972; O’Connor, 1995). The main 
advocate of the first variant is Professor Bainbridge from the University of 
California, Los Angeles School of Law. While he admits that he is a contractarian 
(2002a, b, c, and d), Bainbridge rejects Alchian and Demsetz’s claim that the firm 
has no power of fiat nor is the firm made up of a series of connected contracts 






institutionalists’ argument and accepts Coasean theory of the firm (e.g. 2002a:18-
21). He contends that in a public corporation, an authority-based decision making 
system instead one based on consensus (Arrow, 1974) is necessary to overcome 
the collective action problems faced by the shareholders. A central decision 
marker with “largely unreviewable authority” (2002c:204) that has the power to 
effect adaptive responses to changed conditions due to asset specificity, bounded 
rationality and opportunism (2002c:201) is an essential attribute of the firm. This 
central decision maker is the nexus of the firm and is the board of directors.   
 
The other variant, proposed by Professor Blair of Vanderbilt University Law 
School and Professor Stout, also of UCLA, focuses more on the function of the 
board as a mediator rather than a monitor. Under their version of the model, the 
shareholders are not the only residual claimants of the firm as proposed by the 
neoclassical economists like Easterbrook and Fischel (1991). All the other 
nonshareholder groups, such as creditors, employees, managers and local 
government make contributions in order for an enterprise to succeed, just like in a 
team production (Stout, 2002). Team production, according to Blair and Stout 
(2001a), is a complex productive activity involving many parties and the resulting 
output is generally neither separable nor individually attributable to the original 
contributors. The assets contributed are generally firm-specific and once 
committed to team production cannot be withdrawn and sold elsewhere for their 
full value. Therefore, contrary to the economic analysis that parties are always 
free to negotiate the best deal that protects their interests in a contractual 
arrangement, contracts in the “team production” setting are difficult to design so 






contributions to the team (Blair & Stout, 2001a:419). Therefore all parties 
willingly subject themselves to an independent body, a meditating hierarch in the 
form of the board of directors, who will monitor their efforts and determine how 
each can best be rewarded. The role of corporate governance is thus to provide a 
structure that will maximize the sum of all the risk-adjusted returns enjoyed by all 
of the groups that participate in the firm by putting the board of director at the top 
of the firm hierarchy and mediating the horizontal disputes among team members 
that may arise along the way (Blair & Stout, 1999:264).  
 
 A detailed analysis of the two variants is outside the scope of this essay, but some 
preliminary points may be made. Although the two variants do not necessary 
contradict each other, there are subtle differences. While Blair and Stout’s team 
production theory is derived from looking at the economic functions of corporate 
law, it can hardly be termed a contractarian approach in the traditional sense. The 
term “contractarian” has come to be associated with legal scholars who apply the 
economist’s nexus of contract theory to explain firm phenomena (Millon, 
1995:16). As a matter of fact, they reject both the usual principal-agent analysis 
(Meese, 2002) and that shareholders are the ultimate residual claimants (Blair & 
Stout, 1999). The team production model with the director functioning as the 
“ultimate decisionmaking body within the firm” (Blair & Stout, 1999: 290) and 
taking into account the interests of all corporate constituents instead of those of 
the shareholders alone, has a communitarian facet (Blair & Stout, 1999:253) that 
find more support in the realist/organic theory than with the contractual theory. In 
fact, as early as 1932, the late Harvard Law School professor, E. Merrick Dodd 






that sought to benefit constituencies other than shareholders in situations in which 
the result would be a diminution of profits (Dodd, 1932), although his failure to 
distinguish between directors and officers was unfortunate (Bainbridge, 2002c). 
However, Blair and Stout have expressly disassociated themselves with the 
communitarians (1999: 253-54). 
 
On the other hand, Bainbridge has expressly said that his model is based on the 
nexus of contract theory (2002b, c and d). However, by saying that the nexus is 
the board of director and not the firm, he is changing a fundamental element in the 
nexus of contract theory, whether by the neoclassical or the institutionalist variant. 
In addition, even from a legal standpoint, although the board of directors makes 
decisions on behalf of the firm, in normal cases it never assumes personal liability 
and so it is difficult to see how it can be a “party to the set of contracts we call the 
firm” (Bainbridge, 2002c: 204). Since the position of the board is not explained as 
a contractual party, there is in fact no need for the model to rely on the nexus of 
contract theory for support. As Bainbridge himself admits, “the director primacy 
model takes contractarian theory to its logical extreme by severing the link 
between means and ends – the allocation of control and the identification of 
legitimate corporate ends” (Bainbridge, 2003: 572). Nonetheless, Bainbridge 
maintains that fiduciary obligations of the board should only be owed to 
shareholders and the obligation arising out of that relationship should be one of 
maximizing shareholder wealth (2002c:258). This is the greatest distinction 








That said, the director primacy model and the related team production theory of 
the firm have their merits and need to be given serious consideration in future 
research on corporate governance. Their strength lies in them being “positive 
theories” – by contesting the imagine of self-interested managers and directors 
under the agency cost theory and the related shareholder supremacy model, these 
theories paint a positive picture of the corporation and give a ray of hope to 
management research, which has so far been dominated by the “gloomy vision” 
(Ghoshal, 2005:86). In addition, their effective use of the same conceptual 
apparatus that has been relied on by the proponents of the shareholder supremacy 
model allow them to challenge some of the issues head-on and to gain wider 
acceptance than the previous models in a research area where the law-and-
economics approach dictates (Millon, 2000). This also explains the amount of 
interest they have generated in legal literature since the publication of the series of 
articles. The models have already spawned a number of articles that apply the 
director primacy model to case law (Hanewicz, 2004) or employ the mediating 
hierarch model to examine a variety of corporate law problems (e.g. see Butler, 
1999; Meurer, 2004; Mitchell, 1999).  
 
Table 2-2 below summarizes the four models of corporate governance.  
 
Table 2-2 Overview of the Legal Models of Corporate Governance 
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Lessons from the legal models of corporate governance 
There are two lessons learnt. First, by outlining the legal theories of corporation 
together with the related models of the firm, this chapter shows that despite the 
current dominance of legal-economic research in the area of corporate law 
literature, the root theories for the legal models are pluralistic. However, the basic 
tenets in corporate law should remain the same. They are: separate legal entity of 
the corporation distinct from its incorporators and its controller; the board of 
directors is sui generis and not agents of the shareholders but fiduciaries of the 
corporation; and corporate law basically regulates the relationships among 
constituents within the firm, i.e. shareholders, directors and officers. Outside 
constituents such as employees, creditors, consumers and the local government are 
protected by other laws such as contract law, employment law, environmental law, 
banking law etc. and have no place in corporate law.  
 
Next, the shareholders are considered as owners of the corporation with property 
rights and not merely residual claimants who only have contractual claims against 
the corporation. Law has always considered proprietary rights different from 
contractual rights. Finally, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation as a 
whole and case law has generally defined this to mean shareholders interests only 






Viewed in those lights, this chapter shows why there is no unanimous acceptance 
of any model of corporate governance. Interestingly, it can be seen that the 
managerialistic model is the one that stays closest to the basic law tenets as 
compared to other models. In a way, it can be argued that this is the model that the 
law envisaged when incorporation as a business vehicle was first introduced. 
However, the model went out of vogue with the increase awareness on corporate 
governance and shareholder activism. Another observation is that the 
communitarian and the director primacy model, especially the team production 
variant, have many similarities in their legal assumptions. This generally reflects 
the growing discontent amongst legal scholars over the shareholder-centered and 
wealth-centered themes surrounding the shareholder supremacy model, especially 
in view of the recent corporate scandals. Finally, from an economist’s point of 
view, the director primacy model looks promising as a governance model as it 
addresses some of the concerns raised by legal theorists and left unanswered by 
the predominant shareholder supremacy model.  
 
Table 2-3 gives a comparative view of the various legal models of corporate 
governance and how they fair against the basic legal tenets on corporation.      
  
Table 2-3   Comparing Legal Models of Corporate Governance against Basic 
Corporate Law Tenets 
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Second, although the models appear to be distinct and independent of each other, 
they share some common features that allow possible integration at various levels. 
For instance, the shareholder supremacy model and director primacy model may 
be at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of the placement of shareholders in 
the corporate governance structure, but both of them are based on similar 
economic foundations. The director primacy model may even be touted as an 
“improved version” of how the generally “gloomy vision” painted by the 
shareholder supremacy model can be reversed using the economics instruments 
that corporate law scholars have come to love. On the other hand, the 
contractarians and the communitarians who in the past may have been like passing 
“ships in the night, with only an occasional exchange of broadsides to enliven the 
proceedings” (Bainbridge, 1997:860) will find common language when they now 
talk about the wide discretion conferred upon the board and its mediating role. In 
the legal literature, there are already scholars who look into the possible merger of 
the contractarian and communitarian approaches into a “blended model” 
(Callahan, Dworkin, Fort & Schipani, 2002; Fort & Schipani, 2000). The future 
for discourse on the legal models of the corporation therefore looks bright and it is 









2.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
Implications of the legal theories and models of the corporation and corporate 
governance for management research are three folds: pluralism, theory 
construction and hypotheses testing. 
 
2.3.1 Pluralism 
Management researchers studying corporate governance have generally relied on 
a few theoretical perspectives to understand the characteristics and behaviors of 
the various actors in a firm and the relationships between them. Other than agency 
theory which is the most dominant theoretical framework, the other more 
commonly used theories are the stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson, 1997), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
stakeholder theory (Turnbull, 1994), institutional theory (Scott, 1995), social 
network theory (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). All the theories have their strengths 
and weaknesses and as point out by Lynall, Golden and Hillman (2003), it is not a 
matter of choosing one theoretical perspective over another, but rather of 
identifying under which conditions each is more applicable. As such, the 
introduction of theories from another field can help to inject new insights and add 
plurality to management research.   
 
In general, legal models can play two roles. First, by giving insights about the 
nature of organizations from a legal perspective, these legal models help to 
corroborate some existing management concepts on corporation and corporate 
governance. This will ensure that the management theories are both normatively 







An example can be seen with the stewardship theory. When Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson formulated the theory in 1997, they only considered from 
psychological and sociological points of view to support their argument of how 
they perceived the executives as stewards can be motivated to act in the best 
interests of their principals. If they had consulted the legal models of corporate 
governance at that time, they would have been able to strengthen their case on the 
stewardship theory by leveraging on a point iterated by the legal theorists, i.e. that 
the default rule for executives under the law is to act in the best interests of their 
principals. This duty to act in the best interest of the principals is enshrined as the 
duty of loyalty and is enforceable through legal sanctions. According to 
institutional theory, the stewardship model is sustainable as organizations can 
reflect the enduring rules institutionalized and legitimized by their social 
environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Meyer, & Rowan, 1977) which include 
the legal environment (Scott, 1995). 
 
Also, management scholars who adhere to the resource dependence theory of the 
board that emphasizes the ability of the board to bring resources to the firm (Daily 
& Dalton, 1994a, b; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and the stakeholder model of board composition (Hillman, Keim & Luce, 
2001) will find camaraderie in the communitarian and the director primacy-team 
production models of the firm. This is echoed by Daily, Dalton and Cannella 







Blair and Stout’s (2001) [team production model] analysis 
suggests that directors need a high degree of discretion in 
allocating corporate resources. This is … analogous to resource 
dependence theory …This reconceptualization of directors’ 
responsibilities and roles further highlights the importance of 
incorporating alternative theoretical perspectives in future 
corporate governance research. 
 
The other role that legal models can play is to provide ammunitions for 
management theorists to challenge the dominant agency theory. Researchers like 
Jeffrey Pfeffer and the late Sumantra Ghoshal have been lashing out at the agency 
theory as being a  “harmful” (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996:12) and “bad management 
theory” (Ghoshal, 2005:75) that is “bad for practice” (Pfeffer, 2005:96). They are 
generally concerned with the perceived negative influence these “ideologically 
inspired amoral theories” have on managers’ ethical values (Ghoshal, 2005:76). 
Other researchers like Dan Dalton and Catherine Daily repeatedly warn against 
the over reliance on agency theory as the foundation of corporate governance 
research because of the failure of statistical support for a number of fundamental 
premises of the theory (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Certo and 
Roengpitya, 2003; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Lane, Cannella, & 
Lubatkin, 1998; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993). However, economic-based agency 
theory continues to dominate management research ((Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 
2003). Some have commented that this is due to a large extent of other disciplines 
not being able to come up with ideas to rival agency theory or the maximization of 






corporate governance show that this is not entirely true. New theories can be 
developed and the communitarian model of the firm, team production theory, the 
boards as a mediating hierarch model etc. are ideas that are worth exploring by the 
researchers in the management field. 
 
2.3.2 Theory Construction 
Management studies is not a micro-dominated field. It is a multidisciplinary field 
that encompasses micro, meso, macro perspectives and paradigms concerning 
corporation drawn from various sources (Porter, 1996). Traditionally, however, 
management research has been built on psychological, sociological and 
anthropological theories (for organization and human resource studies) or 
economic and political theories (for strategic management studies). With the 
exception of Zahra and Pearce’s class hegemony theory and the legalistic 
perspective in the treatment of boards of directors (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), very 
few legal theories or legal-economic theories have made their way into 
management literature on corporate governance.  
 
Yet one of the roles of law in social science research is seen as providing a 
“constitutive environment” (Edelman & Suchman, 1997: 483). This means that 
the legal system constructs and empowers various classes of organizational actors 
and delineates the relationships between them. For instance, the law defines the 
differences between the corporation and an unincorporated association. The law 
also defines who is a director and what his responsibilities are. It is an 
environment that the corporation encounters concretely and the latter has to devise 






with their diverse backgrounds in sociology, history, economics, political studies 
etc. in additional to their training in law, help to flesh out this “constitutive 
environment” by creatively structuring theories and ideas on how the law works. 
These theories grounded in the legal framework can then act as building blocks 
upon which the management researchers construct their theories.  
 
For instance, because of the strong influence of the agency theory on management 
research, research on the board generally starts with the premise that it is 
“secondary” and subservient to the shareholders-principals. However, the director 
primacy model opens up the possibility of examining the board from another light. 
Giving a central decision maker with “largely unreviewable authority” 
(Bainbridge, 2002c:204) means that discussion of the board composition should 
extend beyond the independent vs. dependent mix or what are the resources the 
directors may bring to the board. New theories and issues should be propounded 
to discuss, for example, whether integrity and ethical values should be major 
criteria in board selection rather than mere skills and resources the potential 
director may possess and what are the ways to ensure this “largely unreviewable 
authority” is not abused. 
 
2.3.3 Hypotheses Testing 
While legal scholars may be good at formulating theories and arguing on issues, 
they generally lack the methodological skills and requisite incentives to test out 
their theories. Traditionally, legal scholarship pursues doctrinal, interpretive and 
normative purposes rather than empirical ones. As pointed out by Goldsmith and 






rather than scientific training and law schools usually produce lawyers and not 
graduate students. They do not possess the requisite training or background that 
most sophisticated statistical work requires (Heise, 1999; Goldsmith & Vermeule, 
2002).  
 
In addition, the most valuable legal literature is found in articles and books that 
detail, reconcile and distinguish lines of precedent drawn from the various legal 
sources like statutes and courts’ decisions and empirical legal scholarship 
generally garners less prestige in the legal academic circle than doctrinal and 
theoretical research (Heise, 1999). This is in line with the legal formalist tradition 
where judicial decisions are determined by precedent. This means that what is 
important to lawyers and legal scholars is not statistically how many cases have 
decided, for instance, that a corporation may apply for Chapter 11 protection, but 
how it may do so under different circumstances. A result of this is that anecdotal 
evidence and assertions unconnected to an empirical basis fill law review articles 
and judicial opinions that may appear unscientific to researchers from other 
schools, e.g. political scientists (Epstein & King, 2002) and economists.  
 
To bridge this gap between theoretical and empirical research, Epstein and King 
(2002) have suggested that one way is to encourage law professors to develop 
their methodological skills by collaborating with a methodologist, for example, a 
social or political scientist. The other possible way, especially in the area of issues 
relating to corporation and organization, is to invite management researchers to 







For instance, as Meese (2002) comments on Blair and Stout’s team production 
theory, they limit their theory to public corporations on the assumption that 
nonshareholder constituents of such firms are particularly vulnerable to 
opportunism. However, he points out that such assumption has not been 
empirically proven and he argues the converse may be true, i.e. certain attributes 
of public corporations render participants in such ventures less vulnerable to 
opportunism than participants in private firms (2002:1646-1672). Nonetheless, the 
whole discourse remains at the stage of rational theorizing and these exchanges 
will probably continue to dominate many pages in law reviews in the future until 
someone can help to formulate and test the assumptions and underlying premises.     
 
2.4 AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research potential in the area of corporate governance is vast. As outlined 
above, the collaboration of legal models and management theories is beneficial 
and necessary for a more holistic understanding of how best organizational 
resources can be deployed and conflicts among the myriad participants in 
organizations can be resolved (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). As the 
shareholder supremacy model has largely been explored through research on 
agency theory and the managerialistic model is out of vogue, our agenda for 
research will concentrate mainly on the two newer legal models, i.e. 
communitarian model and the director primacy-team production models. Below 
are a few themes that can be further explored. For simplicity, I have divided them 








2.4.1 Board Level 
Role of the Board  
The role of the board under the agency theory has always been one of monitoring. 
To enable boards to effectively carry out their monitoring function, it has been 
hypothesized that boards dominated by outside, nonaffiliated directors are better 
monitors as compared to boards consisting primarily of insiders (current or former 
executives and managers of the firm) (Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein, 1994; Daily, 
1995). However, as it has repeatedly been pointed out, this hypothesis has yet to 
be unequivocally supported by empirical evidence (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 
2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Other 
roles of the board is to bring resources to the firm in the form of (1) advice and 
counsel, (2) legitimacy, (3) channels for communicating information between 
external organizations and the firm, and (4) preferential access to commitments 
for support from important elements outside the firm (Hillman, Cannella, & 
Paetzold, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). However, many researchers found it 
tenuous to argue that the monitoring board is able to embrace these other roles 
because of the inherent conflict between monitoring and being involved in 
operations at the same time (Dallas, 2003; Langevoort, 2001; Rindova, 1999). The 
research question would be therefore whether the board should be viewed to 
embrace a larger role, arguably a mediating role rather than the monitoring role. 
This issue is explored in greater depth in Chapter 3. 
 
A System of Prioritization  
As both the communitarian and team production models of corporate governance 






in allocating corporate resources amongst various competing constituents as a 
matter of output rather than input. The challenge is therefore to devise a 
framework or a system of prioritization to assist directors to make choices among 
competing interests in these circumstances (Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, & Schipani, 
2002). Although not all members of the team will receive equal or fair shares of 
the surplus generated, they are at least to be compensated a modest premium over 
her opportunity cost (Blair & Stout, 1999:282). A possible staring point may be to 
look at how “team-specific” is the contribution by a particular team member. If 
the asset is very “team specific”, i.e. it can only be used in the team and cannot be 
easily withdrawn from the team and sold for their full value elsewhere (Stout, 
2003), then the interests of the contributor should be given a higher priority as 
compared to those of a contributor who can easily withdraw her investment. 
However, for its mediating role to work, the board would need to be free from 
extralegal and political pressures to favor the demands of some constituencies 
over others (Millon, 2000:1027). The paramount consideration should still be the 
interests of the firm as a whole as without this team, there would be no production 
nor need for contribution. The role of the board under the mediating model is far 
more complex than under that under the monitoring model and a framework of 
prioritization of interests needs to be worked out.  
 
Director as Protector  
A related role for the board is its “protection” role. Inherent in the team 
production analysis is that it is not only possible for the corporate executives to 
opportunistically impose “agency costs” on shareholders but it is also possible for 






other nonshareholder groups that make the team-specific investments in the 
corporate team (Blair & Stout, 2003:683). Therefore, to ensure that none of the 
group may abuse their positions, the board will have to take on a policing role and 
act as an independent arbitrator in times of disputes. How to ensure the 
independence of the board and what are the proper incentives and reward schemes 




As mentioned above, it has not been conclusively proven that there is a positive 
relationship between board composition and financial performance. However, it 
cannot be denied that the independence of the board is an important element 
whether under the agency theory or under the communitarian and director primacy 
models of governance. The difference between the definition of “independence” 
under the agency theory and that under the other two models is that 
“independence” in the former means independence from management and parties 
that may be related to the management such as suppliers and creditors. This flows 
from the fact that agency theory is a control-based theory where it is believed that 
managers by virtue of their firm-specific knowledge and managerial expertise will 
pursue actions that will benefit themselves and not those of the principals, i.e. firm 
owners (Mizruchi, 1988). Since the board is supposed to act as a monitor to check 
on the managers, they therefore should not be related to them. On the other hand, 
directors are encouraged to have strong ties with the shareholders, since this will 
ensure that their interests will be aligned with those of the shareholders (Jensen 






However, this argument ignores the plethora of studies which have found that an 
effective board needs to tap on important stakeholders other than shareholders 
(Burt, 1980; Hillman, Keim & Luce, 2001), such as CEO (management/employee), 
external financers or creditors (capital), supplier (raw materials), buyers etc. for 
resources. Also, an effective board needs to have a feel for the functionality of the 
firm. In addition, a board should theoretically be watching out for the interests of 
the firm as a whole and its judgment should not be bias for or against any one 
corporate group. The research question would therefore be whether it is useful to 
artificially classifying directors as independent or non-independent according to 
the black letters of the definition.  
 
Selection Criteria  
Another possible research theme for the organization behaviorists to explore is 
whether the subjective measures such as ethical and moral values of the potential 
candidate should play an important criterion in board selection in addition to 
objective measures like independence and skills. Under both variants of the 
director primacy model, the director is at the pinnacle of the corporate governance 
structure and acts as the fiduciary of the firm with almost uninhibited discretion, 
except occasional sanctions from the court. Therefore, honesty and loyalty 
become crucial attributes of directors more so now than they were before. Blair 
and Stout (1999:315-316) offer three aspects of corporate law and culture that are 
likely to encourage directors to serve their firm’s interests rather their own 
interests, namely, enjoyment and reputational interests, strict no self-dealing law, 
and corporate cultural norms of fairness and trust. All these need to be empirically 






2.4.2 Manager and Employee Level 
Management and Employee Compensation 
Under the team production theory, the relationship between a manager and an 
investor cannot be easily defined by a formal contract that promises specific 
rewards in return for a specific contribution as Stout explains, such contracts are 
unresponsive to unanticipated changes in circumstances and create their own 
opportunities for rent-seeking (2003: 682). They give the example where the 
manager’s salary is tied to some “objective” measure of performance, such as 
share price. Both the investor and the manager can claim their sides of the story in 
the event that there is a change in share price. Therefore, there is a need to work 
out an incentive scheme that not only rewards the manager for her contribution 




Professor Marleen O’Connor at Stetson University College of Law, a labor 
economist and a communitarian, has been exploring how the directors’ fiduciary 
obligations can be extended to workers and executives to ensure economic justice 
in a situation where a plant is closed (O’Connor, 1995). In fact, as pointed out by 
Millon (2002), Blair and Stout’s team production-mediating hierarch model 
echoes very much like the “neutral referee model” that O’Connor has proposed in 
her series of papers (1991; 1993; 1995). In her opinion, fiduciary duties to 
employees would include obligations to provide information and consult about 
strategic decision that affect job security and working conditions. At times where 






body of the workers to appeal to the courts for a decision (O’Connor, 1995). The 
presence of the board as an independent party in addition will be able to motivate 
the employees and help to correct Leibenstein’s “X-inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 
1987) by cultivating trust between workers and shareholders if the latter can 
believe in its neutrality and fairness (Millon, 2000). Therefore, the challenge is 
work out a system where this trust between the board and the employees can be 
built. 
 
2.4.3 Stakeholder Level 
Shareholder Activism  
Shareholder activism has gone too far as a modern day phenomenon for it to be 
reversed or stopped. At one extreme end, the communitarian and the team 
production models have the implication of reducing shareholders’ control over the 
firm assets and outputs (Bebchuk, 2005; Millon, 1995; Stout, 2003). Although by 
repositioning the director’s role as one of mediating rather than monitoring does 
not directly call for a curtailing of shareholder activism, it means that directors can 
make trade-offs between the conflicting interests of different corporate 
constituencies even when the shareholders clearly object to them as long as the 
trade-offs benefit the firm as a whole (Stout, 2003: 693). Millon argues that the 
board would need to be fully protected from shareholder efforts to influence its 
behavior through the threat of removal by proxy fights or hostile tender offers and 
the boards would need to be self-perpetuating, rather than subject to selection by 







On the other hand, as Blair and Stout explain, the mediating hierarchy model does 
not imply that all the individuals and groups that make firm- specific investment 
in a public corporation will receive equal, or fair shares of the surplus generated 
from team production (1999:282). Therefore, a shareholder is expected to have 
different legal rights as compared to those of an employee. The key theme in the 
team production model is that every team member will willingly cede control over 
the firm and their sunk-cost, team specific investments to an independent party 
because they perceive their interests are served by doing so and that they will 
receive better return than if they did not do so. The board’s job is to balance team 
members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that 
the productive coalition stays together (Blair & Stout, 1999; Stout, 2003). 
Therefore, instead of pursuing shareholders’ wealth alone, the board will now 
have a broader view to pursue the firm’s wealth. Most of the time, shareholders’ 
wealth is still the paramount concern as every team member’s return is tied to it. 
Even if the board has to make a judgment call to sacrifice shareholder’s short-term 
interests, it is believed that this is done in view of the firm’s overall long-term 
benefits.  
 
Nevertheless, the caveat for the mediating model to work is that the director must 
not use their powers to line their own pockets (Stout, 2003:693) or do anything 
that will hurt the firm as a whole. There must therefore be a proper mechanism for 
intervention in the event that such things happen. In a way, suggestions such as 
strengthening shareholders’ power, allowing shareholders to make amendments to 
corporate charters or initiate changes to the state of incorporation and even power 






role and can be viewed as part and parcel of the that shareholders bargain for 
when they cede control over their investments to boards of directors. The 
shareholders are expected to be rational and if they try to vote the directors out of 
office without seeing the bigger picture of things, they will be digging the grave 
for the whole team production. 
 
The next challenge for both researchers in the legal and management field will 
thus be how to devise a proper mechanism that can capture the essence of the 




As firms and organizations become increasingly sophisticated and complex, 
management research needs to expand its horizon and tap into other related fields 
in order to answer the issues that arise in a comprehensive manner. Taking a 
myopic view will only result in in-breeding and perpetuating concepts and ideas 
that may not be in sync with other disciplines. Although it has been remarked that 
each discipline “may view corporate governance in a different way, somewhat like 
the apocryphal group of blind people trying to identify an elephant through touch 
by each describing quite different parts of the animal” (Turnbull, 1997: 180), by 
bringing together knowledge from various disciplines, we will be able to paint a 
complete elephant. 
 
The chapter has thus far shown the importance of legal theories and models of the 






the firm and models of corporate governance that used to prevail or are prevailing 
in the legal literature, we gain a better understanding of how legalists see the firm. 
We are also able to appreciate how legal scholars try to reconcile the legal 
framework of business organization with the current economic, sociological or 
political theories. In addition, it is agreed that law coupled with economics can 
result in powerful theories to explain how a corporation should be structured, as 
seen in the shareholder supremacy model and director primacy model.  
 
In the second half of the chapter, I have suggested a few ways of how these legal 
theories and models may be used in management research, namely, pluralism, 
theory construction and hypotheses testing. Although an in-depth discussion of all 
the legal theories and models is not possible due to space constraint, I have in the 
last part of this chapter sketched out a framework for potential investigation. It is 
hoped that this will act as a starting point that will spark off creative ideas for 






BOARD AS MEDIATING HIERARCH  
– DETERMINANTS OF BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces legal literature as a source for discovering new theoretical 
models of corporate governance. Although there are various legal models of corporate 
governance being proposed by scholars and some echo those applied in management 
studies as explored in Chapter 2, one model that has received a lot of attention lately 
is the team production theory and its mediating hierarch board model proposed by 
Blair and Stout (1999, 2001a). Under the team production theory, the board of 
directors’ main responsibility is to mediate conflicting interests and allocate the 
returns generated by corporate assets among corporate constituencies (Blair & Stout, 
1999, 2001a; Stout, 2003). This is in contrast to the monitoring role of the board – 
monitoring the actions of managers-agents to protect the interests of shareholders-
principals – posited under the traditional agency cost theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Mizruchi, 1983).  
 
So far the discussion on the mediating hierarch board has been confined to legal 
literature (e.g. Crespi, 2003; Coates, 1999; Kostant, 2002; Meese, 2002; Millon, 2000) 
– except for a brief reference to the model made by Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) 
in their introduction to the special topic forum on corporate governance in the July 
2003 issue of the Academy of Management Review. Even though it has been lauded as 




a “compelling model of corporate governance” (Kostant, 2002: 670) with “substantial 
merit” (Crespi, 2003: 626) by its supporters, its theoretical contributions to 
management research have yet to be explored. This essay intends to provide that “first 
bridge” to introduce the model to management researchers.  
 
Before I explore the implications of the mediating hierarch board model, it is 
important to note a few points. First, it is not the aim of this essay to disprove the 
agency theory or prove the team production theory, both of which have been amply 
dealt with elsewhere (e.g. see Blair & Stout, 1999, 2001a, b; Bratton, 1989; Eisenberg, 
1999a; Stout, 2002, 2003). However, some of the shortcomings of the agency theory 
in adequately describing the dynamics of corporate governance will be discussed and 
the team production theory is proposed as a plausible alternative to explain the 
characteristics and the roles of the various corporate constituents of the firm.  
 
Second, to allow the reader to have a better understanding of the differences between 
the mediating board and the monitoring board, I will be contrasting the two models 
throughout this chapter so that corporate governance researchers and scholars in this 
area can see how the mediating board may fit into the bigger picture of the existing 
corporate governance framework.  
 
Third, I have chosen the issue of board effectiveness to discuss the managerial 
implications of the mediating board in this chapter. The monitoring effectiveness of 
the board is typically viewed in the empirical literature as a function, amongst other 




things, of how the directors’ compensation package is structured and how 
independent the board is. However, the recent string of meta-analyses has cast doubts 
on the relationship between board incentives and firm performance (Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999). I will show that the 
efficiency of the mediating board is dependent on a slightly different set of criteria 
and five sets of testable propositions will be proposed in this regard. 
 
In this way, I hope to inject a fresh perspective of looking at the corporate board and 
that this essay will contribute to the growing body of corporate governance research. 
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. It begins with a brief description of agency 
theory and the related monitoring board model, their strengths and their shortcomings. 
This is followed by an account of the team production theory. It will be shown that 
the board as a mediating hierarch can offer better explanations as to the importance of 
the board’s service/strategic and resource-gathering functions than those offered by 
the monitoring board. The third part of this chapter examines board effectiveness and 
I will be exploring some common determinants of an effective board, namely, 
directors’ compensation and board composition and discuss how they may apply to a 
mediating board. I will also be examining an issue which is not commonly discussed 
in corporate governance literature, i.e. trust, and suggest that internalized 
trustworthiness is also a determinant for an effective mediating board. The chapter 
concludes with some suggestions for future research in this area. 





3.2 AGENCY THEORY AND THE BOARD AS MONITOR 
The origins and the context under which agency theory is applicable have been 
explored extensively elsewhere (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Mizruchi, 1983). In essence, the firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts without 
hierarchies and “no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action [that may be] 
any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any 
two people” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 777). The relationship between the 
shareholders and managers is governed by contract similar to the principal-agent 
relationship, with the main, if not sole, purpose of maximizing shareholders’ wealth 
(Fischel, 1982). Management is thus a product of a continuous process of negotiation 
of successive contracts with the shareholders-principals. The dissatisfied party can 
always terminate the contract (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). The shareholders need the 
management because they do not have the expertise to run a firm. Managers accept 
agency status because they perceive the opportunity to maximize their own utility 
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).  
 
However, agency theorists posit that the shareholders and managers do not share the 
same utility functions. While the shareholders hope that their investments will be 
maximized to their advantage, the managers will rationally maximize their own 
wealth at the expense of the shareholders. This disparity of interests will result in 
agency costs and foster a goal conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1979; Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  




Nonetheless, agents are incentives-driven and their interests can be aligned with those 
of the principals and the agency cost can be reduced if proper mechanisms can be put 
in place to reward, monitor and control the agents’ behavior (Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). The key idea behind the theory is therefore that 
principal-agent relationships should reflect the optimal arrangement that will reduce 
the cost of shirking by the managers-agents in order to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth. The end result of the analysis under agency theory is to increase shareholder 
activism and to empower shareholders in order to exert greater control over the 
corporate governance process.   
 
3.2.1 The Board as Monitor 
Historically, boards were seen to play a largely ceremonial role with little or no 
impact on the operations of the firm (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004) much like “attractive 
ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree” (Mace, 1986:107). However, after agency 
cost theory was introduced to describe the firm in the late 1970s, the agency theorists 
see the primary function of the boards as being a monitoring body to monitor the 
actions of the managers (agents) in order to protect the interests of shareholders 
(principals) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mizruchi, 1983). The board 
itself is under the control of the shareholders and is just another type of agent. The 
same view is shared by many economics, finance and management scholars who are 
of the opinion that the core responsibility of the directors as agents of shareholders is 
to ensure that the managers are acting in the interest of shareholders and maximizing 
their wealth (Berle & Means, 1932; Friedman, 1970; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). 




This role entails evaluating and rewarding the CEO and the senior executives (Boyd, 
1995; Conyon & Peck, 1998); controlling managerial opportunism (Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996) and planning for CEO succession (Pitcher, Chreim & Kisfalvi, 2000).  
 
Link to firm performance.  
From an economics point of view, monitoring by the board will reduce the agency 
costs which the principals would otherwise incur when the managers pursue their 
self-interest at the expense of profit maximization for the shareholders, a problem 
inherent in the separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932). In 
addition, the cost of internal monitoring is also lower than if the role were to be 
assigned outside the firm, like to the courts (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
 
Monitoring board and other roles.  
Other ancillary board functions that have often been cited are its service role and its 
role as a provider of resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996). The service role involves directors advising the CEO and top 
managers on administrative and other managerial issues, as well as actively initiating 
and formulating strategy (Rindova, 1999). The resource dependence role refers to the 
ability of the board to bring external resources crucial to the firm’s success (Boyd, 
1990; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) outline a list of activities to be included under this 
role: (1) providing legitimacy and bolstering the public image of the firm (Certo, 
2003; Selznick, 1949), (2) providing expertise (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), 




providing advice and counsel (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Mintzberg, 1983), (3) linking 
the firm to important stakeholders and other entities (Burt, 1980; Hillman, Keim & 
Luce, 2001), (4) facilitating access to resources such as capital and funds (Mizruchi & 
Stearns, 1988), (5) building external relations, diffusing innovation (Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998), and (6) aiding in the formulation of strategy or other important firm 
decisions (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  
 
However, many researchers found it tenuous to argue that the monitoring board is 
able to embrace these two additional roles (Dallas, 2003; Langevoort, 2001; Rindova, 
1999). First, the bases underlying the board’s service/strategic and resource-gathering 
functions are not complementary but contradictory to the role of monitoring (Dallas, 
2003; Langevoort, 2001). Agency theorists argue that the decision authority and 
control should be assigned to two separate bodies in order to achieve two types of 
efficiencies – from delegating responsibility to an agent with the most relevant 
knowledge and from using another agent to keep the first agent in check (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). It therefore follows that the board should just concentrate on 
monitoring those who are deploying the relevant knowledge, such as consultants, 
investment bankers, and lawyers etc. who can inject outside judgment, prestige and 
image to the firm.  
 
Similarly, the resource-gathering function, which requires the board to be in touch 
with its external environment and its stakeholders, runs counter to the agency theory 
that assumes that directors related to the organization, e.g. from a customer or a 




supplier firm are less independent (Baysinger, & Butler, 1985) and so less effective. 
If so, then why do we need directors to perform the monitoring role as well as the 
service/strategic and resource-gathering functions? A logical argument may be that an 
effective monitoring board should just focus on monitoring and leave the rest to 
consultants and management.  
 
Second, as Rindova (1999) points out, the monitoring role of the board is too narrow 
to explain the collaborative relationship between the board and the management in 
strategy planning and decision-making. Agency theory assumes that decision-making 
tasks are divided and performed sequentially in a way where mangers first generate 
alternatives for the board to select and then the board will monitor and evaluate the 
outcome of the chosen alternatives that have been put into practice by the managers 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, this does not reflect reality because in practice, 
strategic decisions evolve through complex, nonlinear and fragmented processes of 
continuous interactions between the board and the management (Cohen, March, & 
Olsen, 1972; Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Willson, 1986; Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976).  
 
All these point to the fact that there is a broader sense of the board’s role that cannot 
be explained satisfactorily by the board simply being a monitor and agent for the 
shareholders. 
  




3.3 TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY AND BOARD AS MEDIATING 
HIERARCH 
As shown in Chapter 2, the agency theory has not been as widely accepted in legal 
research compared to management research. This is because of some fundamental 
conceptual incompatibilities between the model, which is essentially economics-
finance based, and the realities of the corporate law framework (Bratton, 1989a; 
Eisenberg, 1999a; Stout, 2002). In essence, corporate law makes a distinction 
between directors and managers. While managers may be considered as agents being 
employed to operate the firm on behalf of the shareholders, directors enjoy a special 
status in the eyes of the law. Directors are considered autonomous fiduciaries of the 
corporation and not “agents” of the shareholders (Clark, 1985; Ferran, 1999).  
 
As fiduciaries or trustees of the corporation and its assets, the law allows the board to 
have wide discretion and control as to how these assets are used and how any surplus 
will be distributed (Blair & Stout, 2001a). The board can therefore be viewed as the 
central decision-maker for the firm (Bainbridge, 2002c) and not subject to the direct 
control of any outside party (Blair & Stout, 1999, 2001a). This unique position of the 
director in law cannot be adequately explained by the agency theory of the firm 
(Bratton, 1989a; Eisenberg, 1999a; Stout, 2002).  
 
Legal scholars have thus begun to search for alternative theories in the last decade to 
explain the corporate governance of a firm. A promising theme that has emerged 




turns the attention to the board and places the board at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy. 
 
Margaret Blair of Vanderbilt University Law School and Lynn Stout of the University 
of California, Los Angeles School of Law, leading scholars in the field of corporate 
law, have in several recent and important co-authored articles (1999, 2001a, b) set 
forth and elaborated upon an “intriguing” model of corporate governance called the 
team production model (Crespi, 2003). They employ legal and economic foundations 
to develop their framework and use it to provide a contrast to the conventional agency 
model of corporate governance.   
 
Under Blair and Stout’s team production theory, the typical public corporation is not 
a “nexus of contracts (explicit or implicit)” but a “nexus of firm-specific investments” 
(Blair & Stout, 1999:275) and shareholders are not the only residual claimants of the 
firm as proposed by the neoclassical economists like Easterbrook and Fischel (1991). 
All the other nonshareholder groups, such as creditors, employees, managers and 
local government make firm-specific investments or contributions in order for an 
enterprise to succeed, just like in a team production, a term first introduced by 
Alchian and Demsetz in their 1972 paper (Stout, 2002).  
 
Team production, according to Blair and Stout (2001a), is a complex productive 
activity involving many parties and the resulting output is generally neither separable 
nor individually attributable to the original contributors. The assets contributed are 




firm-specific and once committed to team production cannot be withdrawn and sold 
elsewhere for their full value. Therefore, contrary to the economic analysis that 
parties are always free to negotiate the best deal that protects their interests in a 
contractual arrangement, contracts in the “team production” setting are difficult to 
design so as to provide adequate incentives for each team member to make optimal 
contributions to the team (Blair & Stout, 2001a:419).  
 
In addition, according to the team production theory, it is not only possible for 
managers to opportunistically impose “agency costs” on shareholders, it is also 
possible for shareholders to do likewise and to rent-seek by claiming more than their 
fair share of investment. Shareholders can be tempted to impose “agency costs” on 
managers and other non-shareholder groups that make firm-specific investments in 
the corporate team, especially when the payments to non-shareholders are large 
relative to net profits (Stout, 2003). Stout (2003) has given the classic example where 
the investor can claim that the manager’s performance is sub-par when it may not be 
due to the latter’s fault and reduces his/her compensation accordingly.  
 
Another possible example of such opportunistic behavior by the shareholders on other 
stakeholders can be seen from the string of research on management entrenchment. 
Under the agency theory, firm performance should improve when the interests of the 
management can be aligned with those of the shareholders, such as allowing 
management to own shares. The management entrenchment hypothesis however 
posits that as management ownership levels increase beyond a certain level, the 




ability to discipline managers declines and thus corporate performance suffers as 
managerial ownership increases further (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Mueller & 
Spitz, 2002; Short & Keasey, 1999). The explanation given for this is that managers 
with large ownership stakes may be so powerful that they no longer intend to 
maximize profit but prefer to maximize market share or technological leadership at 
the expense of profitability ((Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988).   
 
However, viewed from another perspective, with increasing ownership the managers 
actually become shareholders themselves. Instead of only looking forward to profit 
maximization and waiting for the payout from a dividend declaration, these 
shareholders-managers are now able to capitalize on their dual roles to take more than 
their fair share from the firm to the detriment of all other parties.  The point is that the 
shareholders can rent-seek if they want to. 
   
As a result of this fear of mutual opportunism, parties will be reluctant to invest in a 
team. However, their fear and bilateral dependency can be reduced if they can find a 
third party who is not involved in sharing in the surplus to entrust their investments 
and who will monitor their efforts and determine how each can best be rewarded. The 
goals of the team members are therefore aligned under the model, i.e. ceding control 
over their investments to the independent third party in the form of the board for the 
success of the firm. The role of corporate governance here will be to provide a 
structure that will “maximize the sum of all the risk-adjusted returns enjoyed by all of 
the groups that participate in the firm by putting the board of director at the top of the 




firm hierarchy and mediating the horizontal disputes among team members that may 
arise along the way” (Blair & Stout, 1999:264). The end result of the analysis under 
the team production theory is to increase director autonomy.  
 
An overview of the differences between the agency theory and the team production 
theory is given in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1   Overview of the Differences between Agency Theory and Team 
Production Theory 
 
 Agency Theory Team Production Theory 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should 
reflect the optimal arrangement that 
will reduce the cost of shirking by the 
managers-agents  
 
Board of directors should be accepted 
as a fair and trustworthy mediating 
hierarch so that the various corporate 
participants will agree to yield ultimate 
control rights over the corporation to 
the board 
 




Firm is a nexus of contracts voluntarily 
negotiated among the rationally selfish 
parties who join in the corporate 
enterprise 
 
Firm is a nexus of firm-specific 
investments or a complex productive 
activity involving many parties and the 
resulting output is generally neither 
separable nor individually attributable 
to the original contributors 
 
Key  relationship 
under the theory 
 
Shareholders as principals and 
management as agents 
 
Board as the mediating hierarch and the 
rest of the corporate constituents as 
team members 
 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
 
 











Goal conflict (risk differential) Goal alignment (cede control) 
Role of corporate 
governance  
 
To devise a structure that will create 
incentives to minimize the agency 
costs and maximize shareholders’ 
wealth 
 
To provide a structure that will 
maximize the sum of all the risk-
adjusted returns enjoyed by all of the 
groups that participate in the firm by 
putting the board of director at the top 




of the firm hierarchy and mediating the 
horizontal disputes among team 
members that may arise along the way 
 
End result of 
analysis 
Shareholder activism Director autonomy 
 
 
3.3.1 The Board as Mediator 
The role of the board under the team production theory is to act as a mediating 
hierarch that will try to maximize the economic value of all the firm’s assets. There 
are a few implications flowing from this notion of a mediating board. First, although 
the board serves at the top of the pyramid of authority of the firm, it does not manage 
the day-to-day business operations of the firm (Blair & Stout, 1999) which are still 
left to the management. However, it will be involved in the decision-making process 
and intervene when there are conflicts among the various corporate constituents that 
cannot be resolved at the lower levels.  
 
Second, the board as a mediator does not mean that it will no longer perform its 
monitoring function. The board will still act as a monitor for the firm, but its role is 
not limited to overseeing senior management. Rather, its task is to ensure that none of 
the team members may abuse its position to rent-seek on the other members at the 
expense of the team. Therefore, it can fire an executive officer for secretly profiting 
himself/herself by getting kickbacks from business ventures related to the firm or for 
incompetence. It can also rid the firm of greenmailers by buying out their shares 
(Good v. Texaco, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 7501, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 445).   
 




Third, connected to the point above, the mediating board has very wide discretion to 
allocate firm resources. As long as it acts in the best interests of the firm, its decision 
cannot be questioned by the shareholders or the rest of the team members. The only 
caveat is that it must not be involved in self-dealing or use their corporate positions to 
expropriate assets or returns that belong to the firm (Clark, 1985). Other than this, it 
can use corporate resources in ways that it deems fit, sometimes even at the expense 
of shareholders or other team members, as long as the end results benefit the firm as a 
whole. This wide discretion given to the board is enshrined by the law under the 
directors’ duties of loyalty and care and the business judgment rule. 
 
Fourth, the central tenet in the mediating board is that the team members must be kept 
happy so that they remain as a coalition and are willing to continue to work for the 
benefit of the firm. Although, in reality, the mediating hierarch model does not imply 
that all the corporate team members who participate in making firm-specific 
investments will receive equal or fair shares of surplus generated from the team 
production, what is important is the perception by each team member that he or she is 
receiving a fair return. If not, any member who perceives that he or she is excluded 
from the surplus can always exit the team and invest his or her resources elsewhere.  
 
The presence of a board that does not favor any team member or act on behalf on any 
member but is willing to work with everybody in the team to bring about the success 
of firm. It is therefore able to give the team production governance structure 
legitimacy and stability. 





Link to firm performance.  
From an economics point of view, the board is ceded the authority by the various 
team members or stakeholders because, by doing so, they will be able to reduce 
dependency between the members, diminish uncertainty and avoid the transaction 
costs they would otherwise incur in having to negotiate ex ante more complete 
contracts to protect themselves from shirking by the other team members. In addition, 
they can also minimize the losses that would result from the reduced incentives to 
commit firm-specific resources by the various stakeholders if only one class of 
stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, is assigned the exclusive rights to the surplus while the 
rest of the stakeholders have limited rights to claim for their opportunity costs (Crespi, 
2003).  
 
Mediating board and other roles.  
The mediating role of the board is consistent with the other board functions that have 
been identified, namely, the service/strategic and resource-gathering functions. First, 
under the team production theory, the board serves at the top of the organization 
hierarchy and not merely as an agent or subordinate to the shareholders. It is 
contended that this status of being the central decision making body of the firm can 
contribute to board prestige (Certo, 2003).  
 
Board prestige refers to the positive qualities associated with a board (Certo, 2003). It 
is different from reputation. As pointed out by Certo (2003), reputation is a neutral 




concept which can consists of an individual’s positive, negative, or neutral qualities. 
Prestige of a board on the other hand is a positive attribute and is enhanced by the fact 
that under the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978), directors can 
be a source of external variety (Rindova, 1999) and help to link the firm to important 
stakeholders or critical resource holders and other entities (Burt, 1980; Hillman, Keim 
& Luce, 2001). The aggregation of each director’s skills, experience and social 
connections (Certo, 2003), coupled with the leadership status, contributes to board 
prestige, something that cannot be offered by mere consultants. A consultant who is 
engaged to work for the company, no matter how well regarded, is still considered as 
a subordinate. This explains why directors are apt to perform the multiple roles of 
monitoring (in the broad sense as under the mediating board) as well as the 
service/strategic and resource-gathering functions. 
 
Second, this board prestige can not only signal organizational legitimacy and attract 
investment for firms (Certo, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), but it 
also can signal to nonshareholder corporate constituents that the board will be 
sensitive to their interests as well (Langevoort, 2001). This is again in line with the 
mediating board role. 
 
Third, a mediating board that is constantly cooperating with the management to work 
out the optimal plan for resource allocations rather than merely evaluating and 
intervening only if the management does not act in the interests of the shareholders 
offers a more holistic explanation of the board’s strategic and service functions. This 




reflects the findings by researchers using surveys and interviews with directors that 
directors consider assisting management with making strategic decisions one of their 
most important roles (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Rindova, 1999). This also 
explains the fact that corporate boards over the past fifteen years have become 
increasingly active (Eisenberg, 1999b). 
 
Finally, to equip itself as a fair and efficient mediator for the various interests, the 
board should understand how the firm is run. It needs to have members who are 
knowledgeable and understand the synergies of the parties and the external 
environment. The mediating hierarch model, which does not discriminate between 
inside and outside directors, is able to embrace the resource dependence theory quite 
naturally. It is therefore contended that the mediating hierarch model that allows the 
board to balance and capitalize on the various interests to achieve an optimal outcome 
for the firm presents a more accurate description of the importance of the 
service/strategic and resource-gathering functions to the board. 
 
3.4 DETERMINANTS OF BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
 
In the preceding part of this chapter, I have attempted to set up the mediating board as 
a tenable alternative to the monitoring board by highlighting the shortcomings of the 
latter and  supporting the suggestion by Blair and Stout (1999, 2001a) that the former 
may better reflect the reality of current public corporate governance arrangements. 




From a management perspective, the next important question will be how this 
deduction may affect the present stream of corporate governance research.  
 
One issue that will be of interest to management researchers is board effectiveness. 
Here, I define an effective mediating board as a board which can best balance the 
interests of the different stakeholders and bring about an increase in overall firm 
performance. Therefore, the current measures of firm performance such as return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q etc. that focus solely on the increase in shareholders’ wealth are 
too restrictive. An ideal measure of board effectiveness should take into account the 
interests of the various constituents – for the creditors, the credit and risk rating of the 
firm; for employees, the turn-over rating per year etc. and to this end, a balance 
scorecard should be constructed.  
 
However, before the effectiveness of a mediating board can be measured, it is 
important to examine what are some of the factors or determinants of an effective 
board. In the next part of this chapter, I shall argue that for a mediating board to be 
effective in its role, factors such as directors’ pay, board composition and the 
internalized trustworthiness should be considered.  
 
Figure 3-1 below shows the proposed model for the relationships between the 
determinants of an effective mediating board.  
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3.5 DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION 
 
3.5.1 Directors’ Compensation under the Monitoring Board  
Compensation is understandably important in any task-based contractual relationship. 
However, the central argument in agency theory is that not only should the directors 
be compensated for their monitoring role, they should also hold equity positions in 
the firms they serve so that they are more likely to act in the shareholders’ interests, 
given their shared financial interests (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). This 
will ensure their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders and make them 
better monitors (Elson, 1995; Jensen, 1993).  
 
Conversely, if the board’s compensation is in no way linked to the shareholders’ main 
interest, which is to see that their investments in the firm grow, i.e., the appreciation 
of their equity, then the directors will shirk instead of watching over the managers 
vigilantly. Therefore, equity-based compensations such as share ownership and share 
options are preferred. Following this rationale, it is fair for agency theorists to 
vehemently argue that monitoring effectiveness of the board is determined by the 
proportion of equity to non-equity compensation (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
 
However, as Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya (2003) in their meta-analysis of 
229 empirical studies over 40 years show, the relationship between board equity 
compensation and firm performance cannot be statistically supported. This result is to 




be read together with several earlier warnings against the over reliance on agency 
theory as the foundation of corporate governance research (e.g. Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997; Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993).  
 
In addition, it has been argued (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Dalton, & Daily, 1999) 
that equity-based compensation can be dangerous as it can cause the directors to lose 
some of their objectivity and independence. First, the directors routinely set their own 
salary and so allowing the board to set the amount of stock-based compensation and 
the performance target creates a conflict of interest. Furthermore, the board is 
responsible for authorizing stock buybacks, stock option repricings and the issue of 
reload options can potentially give directors big payouts and allow them to benefit 
personally at the expense of the firm generally. Finally, shareholders are actually 
disadvantaged by such practices as substantially increasing a corporate officer’s 
compensation may impact firm’s earnings and dividends. There will also be a 
reduction in per-share value when new equity is issued to redeem derivative securities.  
 
3.5.2 Directors’ Compensation under the Mediating Board.  
In a mediating role, the board is not a team member and does not share in the team 
surplus as a residual claimant (Blair & Stout, 1999). It must remain financially 
independent from all corporate constituents and even from the shareholders since the 
board is supposed to act as a mediating hierarch and its judgment should not be 
biased for or against any one team member (Blair & Stout, 1999). As shown above, 
director compensation systems that tie director pay to stock price performance may 




“introduce conflicts of interest that make it much more difficult for directors to 
credibly play a mediating role” (Blair & Stout, 2001a:443).  
 
That said, directors under the mediating board are not “unselfish altruists” and should 
be compensated well for their service to the coalition (Blair & Stout, 1999: 283). 
Stout has suggested a flat fee for their services (2003). However, compensating 
directors through a flat fee to every director who serves on the board ignores the fact 
that directors’ compensation can be used as an incentive device to encourage boards 
to be efficient mediators. It is contended that a directors’ compensation package 
structured around three components can be a determinant of an effective board. These 
components are how well the firm performs, how satisfied are the various 
constituents to remain as team members of the firm and how much is the personal 
cost to the individual director.  
 
Firm Performance  
Firm performance is crucial as it is the final outcome of all the team-specific 
investments. The reason why a shareholder invest his money in the firm is because 
he/she perceives that he/she will get better return from a good dividend payout then 
say, if he/she puts his/her money in a bank. Similarly, the reason why a manager 
works hard is because he/she perceives that he/she can receive a better pay (if pay is 
contingent) or he/she can continue to receive the same good pay (if pay is fixed) for a 
longer period if the firm continues to do well or performs even better than in previous 
years.  





As argued in the earlier part of this chapter, an effective mediating board is one that 
will try to maximize the economic value of all the firm’s assets. Since it is not 
supposed to be beholden to any corporate constituents, the firm performance measure 
should be board-based taking into account of the interests of the important 
constituents, namely, the shareholders, the creditors and the employees. Therefore, 
the board and each individual director should receive a higher compensation package 
if the firm performs well overall.   
 
Proposition 1a: The overall firm performance will affect directors’ 
compensation in an effective mediating board. 
 
Satisfaction Level of the Constituents  
Under the team production theory of the firm, the ability of the board to keep the 
critical constituents or the team members intact is important as without these 
constituents, the coalition will fall apart and there is no production to start with or 
continue. There will be no need for the board and the directors can lose their jobs. 
Therefore, if the major banker of a firm voluntarily switches out or the firm loses its 
big client or major supplier, the entire team can be at risk and it is important that the 
directors keep these team members happy.  
 
The effectiveness of the board in this sense will be affected by how satisfied are the 
various corporate constituents to be willing to remain in the firm. The satisfaction 




level of the various constituents will in turn depends on how the board has been 
sensitive to their needs, whether they perceive the actions of the board to be fair and 
whether the cost of leaving the team is higher than staying within. Directors’ 
compensation should therefore be structured to be dependent on the satisfaction level 
of the key constituents. 
 
Proposition 1b: The satisfaction level of the corporate constituents 
will affect directors’ compensation in an effective mediating board. 
 
Personal Costs    
Another component that should make up the compensation package of the directors is 
the subjective personal costs that each director will incur by agreeing to sit as a board 
member. While components based on the firm’s performance and the satisfaction 
level of the corporate constituents are performance-driven, personal costs are costs to 
compensate or encourage internalized trustworthiness. As it will be shown later in 
this chapter, internalized trustworthiness is an important determinant of the mediating 
board’s effectiveness.  
 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that internalized trustworthiness is not costless 
(Blair & Stout, 2001b). In particular, it has been empirically found that when the 
personal cost associated with benefiting others rises, the degree of altruism or 
trustworthiness begins to decline (Blair & Stout, 2001b; Sally, 1995). It is contended 
that personal cost can be defined as the cost that a person has to pay in assuming the 




position to do good to another. The personal costs of being a director would include 
both tangible and intangible costs such as opportunity cost, litigation risk cost, time 
cost etc. Different directors would have different personal costs in agreeing to join the 
board. Therefore, each director’s compensation package should also have a 
component that varies with his/her personal costs.  
 
Proposition 1c: Personal costs incurred by each individual director 
will affect directors’ compensation in an effective mediating board. 
 
Undeniably, a strong motivation or incentive for the board to perform well is still 
equitable compensation paid to the directors. By structuring the director’s 
compensation to vary with firm performance, the level of satisfaction of the corporate 
constituents and personal costs, it is believed that this will increase the effectiveness 
of the director in performing his/her mediating role. This will in turn increase the 
overall board effectiveness.  
 
3.6 BOARD COMPOSITION 
 
3.6.1 Board Composition under the Monitoring Board  
Under the agency theory, board independence is defined as the degree to which board 
members are dependent on the current CEO or organization such as to impair 
effective monitoring (Baysinger, & Butler, 1985; Daily, & Dalton, 1994a, b; 
Weisbach, 1988). Directors are generally classified as either insiders – current or 




former managers and employees of the firm – or outsiders. For outsider directors who 
have business relationships with the firm such as suppliers and creditors and/or family 
or social ties with the CEO, they are known as dependent outsiders. Since the role of 
the board in a monitoring position is to check the managers on behalf of the 
shareholders, boards made up of a majority of inside and dependent outside directors 
are perceived to be less effective at monitoring and therefore a disincentive because 
of their dependence on the management and the organization (Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, this has not been proven empirically (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson, 1998) and there is evidence suggesting the opposite — that firms with 
supermajority-outside boards perform worse than other firms, and that firms with 
more inside than outside directors perform about as well as firms with majority (but 
not supermajority) outside boards (Bhagat & Black, 1999). 
 
In addition, there have been studies to show that outside directors with no ties with 
the firm and therefore are likely to know less about the firm than inside directors can 
be overly reliant on observable performance measures such as stock price 
performance to decide to replace the CEO, even though the economic significance of 
the firing is small (Weisbach, 1988). They can also overpay the CEOs and other 
executives (Lambert, Larcher, & Weigelt, 1993). As pointed out by Langevoort 
(2001), just as the presence of outsiders is important to counter the myopic biases and 
possible opportunistic behaviors of the management, the presence of insiders may be 




necessary to serve as a counterweight to predictable outsider biases.  Their presence 
on the board will help to reduce “some of the dysfunctional effects that come from 
the inevitable polarization of the board” (Langevoort, 2001:800). A monitoring model 
faithful to the agency theory will have difficulty in accommodating this proposition. 
 
Finally, it is contended that artificially classifying directors as independent or non-
independent according to the strict definition of independence ignores the subtlety 
involved in the directors’ selection process. Many studies have shown that CEO’s 
involvement in the director selection process can affect the nature of the appointments 
(Kosnik, 1987; Mace, 1986; Pfeffer, 1972). Under social network theory, a CEO is 
likely to appoint people who are demographically similar to him/her and this has been 
empirically found to be true (Westphal, & Zajac, 1995). Westphal and Zajac also 
suggest that these demographically similar directors are more sympathetic to the 
CEOs and therefore leading to awards of more attractive CEO compensation package 
(Westphal, & Zajac, 1995; but see Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998 for an 
opposing view). The point is that even if these new appointees are independent 
outside directors according to the definition, they may still behave like a dependent 
director and therefore rendering the distinction meaningless. As it will be discussed 
later, the important issue is not definitional independence but whether the board can 








3.6.2 Board Composition under the Mediating Board.  
In a mediating board, the composition of an effective mediating board is based on a 
different set of criteria.   
 
Stakeholder representation 
Although the directors should not be financially dependent on any group such as to 
impair their judgment, they need to have a thorough understanding of the needs of the 
various parties and the synergies amongst them before they can mediate competing 
interests. The theory does not reject the idea that former managers, suppliers, 
customers, lawyers, investment bankers etc. can be a good source of firm’s 
knowledge (Langevoort, 2001; Smith, 2004).  
 
In addition, from a resource dependence perspective, organizations must exchange 
resources in order to survive and an effective board is a board that is able to bring 
resources to the firm (Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978). These resources very often are the 
important stakeholders other than shareholders (Burt, 1980; Hillman, Keim & Luce, 
2001), such as CEO (management/employee), external financers or creditors (capital), 
supplier (raw materials), buyers etc. This theory is also borne out by practice. 
Research has shown that there is an increasing trend among US public corporations in 
having corporate boards that represent the interests of a diverse society (Dallas, 2003). 
For instance, service industries, such as motel, restaurant, telephone and airline 
industries which have substantial minority employees are found to have more 




minority representations on board, indicating a stakeholder orientation (Dallas, 2003; 
Fryxell, & Lerner, 1989). 
 
Regardless of the kind of interests they stand for, the presence of the representatives 
(or even sympathizers) of these stakeholders on the board will inevitably influence 
the board to adopt a broad view of a mediator that will consider the firm’s interests as 
a whole, which include the interests they represent, rather than a narrow view as a 
monitor that looks only after the shareholders’ interests. For instance, a banker or 
lawyer on the board may influence the amount of corporate attention directed to 
financial or regulatory concerns. In addition, a banker will also influence the board to 
consider the impact of corporate decisions on debt-holders. Similarly, a senior 
executive member from a major supplier of the firm appointed as a director will bring 
to the attention of the board issues concerning the sources of raw materials etc. Their 
influence on the board to act as a mediator will increase when there are more 
members with stakeholder ties being appointed to the board.  
 
Proposition 2a: Stakeholder orientation is a characteristic of the 
composition of an effective mediating board.  
 
Board Prestige  
A mentioned earlier in §3.3.1, the status of the board being the central decision 
making body of the firm, together with the aggregation of each director’s skills, 
experience, social connections can contribute to board prestige (Certo, 2003; D’Aveni, 




1990). However, these are only the objective measures of prestige. Certo (2003) also 
suggests that there is a subjective element of board prestige based on sociological 
perspective (Alexander, 1972; Wegener, 1992), i.e., how the board is viewed by 
others based on those objective measures since “an individual’s prestige resides in the 
minds of other individuals” (Certo, 2003: 436).  
 
Further, the objective measures of prestige can be enhanced to influence the 
subjective judgment. Directors with high levels of education or who have attended 
well-known educational institutions (Certo, 2003), with pertinent experience (Pfeffer, 
& Salancik, 1978) or with special expertise, e.g. financial proficiency (Marshall, 2001) 
can influence its observer’s perspective. Similarly, board affiliations with important 
stakeholders, such as prestigious clients or suppliers, can demonstrate that the firm is 
embedded within a prestigious social network (Mizruchi, 1996).  
 
This board prestige has a signaling effect to outsiders including potential directors of 
the firm. The signals are both observable and costly to imitate, i.e., unique to each 
board. First, directors’ biographical information is usually open to the public and can 
be easily obtained from prospectuses, annual reports, and corporate websites and so 
interested parties can observe the objective measures. Each board is unique and costly 
to imitate as generally, individuals choose their directorships with care as “directors 
who sit on the board of a poorly performing firm may threaten their own position in 
the elite” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 217). Therefore, alignments with the 




“wrong” firms can be potentially costly for directors, can affect their reputations and 
jeopardize their chances of joining other boards in the future.  
 
In addition, for potential directors who are considering to join the board, how they 
evaluate the board’s prestige will also be influenced by his/her own prestige, as 
his/her own prestige is considered as the guiding “anchors” in decision-making 
(Alexander, 1972; Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Wegener, 1992). This means that 
highly prestigious persons will choose to associate with more prestigious boards and 
less prestigious persons will not mind joining a less prestigious board. In this way, the 
board prestige continues to be reinforced.  
 
Therefore, the prestige of the board acts like a “magnet” to attract similarly 
prestigious persons as directors. Once on board, the prestigious director with his/her 
good educational background, requisite experience and social network ties with 
important stakeholders will more likely perform better in his/her role than a person 
with less prestigious background. In this way, composition of the board can affect 
board effectiveness.  Therefore, it is proposed that, 
 
Proposition 2b: The prestige of the board will affect the composition 








Caveats regarding board composition  
Even though the mediating board embraces a stakeholder orientation, it is 
acknowledged that appointing directors with relationship to the various stakeholders 
or team members, including shareholders, has its risks. First, the perspective of the 
board can be dominated by the stronger board representatives compared to the weaker 
ones. This will affect the board’s ability to mediate fairly amongst the competing 
constituents. Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003) have suggested that often the CEO 
and the external financiers are the most important stakeholders on the board since 
managerial expertise and financing are usually the most urgent issues facing the firm. 
They will influence the type of directors being appointed to the board. Therefore, 
more stringent criteria need to be set to ensure that the selection process of the 
directors is not dominated or “captured” by one or two main stakeholders, including 
shareholders, to the detriment of the firm. For instance, Shivdasani and Yermack’s 
study has shown that companies are gradually removing their CEOs from the director 
selection process (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999) to ensure that the directors are not 
captured by the management.  
 
Proposition 3a: In a mediating board, domination by certain 
stakeholders on the board will moderate the relationship between 
board composition and board effectiveness. 
 
Second, it is impossible for each team member to have a representative on the board 
to champion its cause. The size of the board may be too large if it needs to 




accommodate every view and it has been shown that large boards may have 
difficulties in reaching a consensus on strategic decisions in a timely fashion 
(Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Heracleous, 2004; Judge, & Zeithaml, 1992). 
In addition, as the saying goes, too many cooks spoil the broth. Similarly, too many 
representatives with diverse agendas will affect the efficacy of the board in strategic 
decision-making. It has also been suggested that directors who serve with an implicit 
or explicit agenda may sufficiently distract and disrupt boardroom conversations so as 
to render the board as a whole less effective (Dalton, & Dalton, 2004).  
 
Therefore, the team production theory does not argue for mandatory stakeholders’ 
representation on the board but rather for the opposite. Once the directors are 
appointed onto the board, they should be reminded that they are to act in the best 
interests of the firm regardless of their affiliation, if any. This is the central tenet 
underlying directors’ fiduciary duties in law (Clark, 1985) and the notion of board 
independence under the mediating hierarch model.  
 
The law has all along judiciously guarded this principle of “non-interference” from 
shareholders or any other stakeholder in the board’s decision-making process. This is 
clearly seen from the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate 
Division in the case of Schmidt v. Magnetic Head Corporation (101 A.D.2d 268, 476 
N.Y.S.2d 151, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17811) at 281:  
 




It is well settled that directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to their 
corporation (Pepper v Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306), and they are 
presumed to act honestly (Clifford v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 264 
App Div 168, 170). Minority shareholders cannot interfere with the 
management of a corporation so long as those in control are acting 
honestly and within their discretionary powers (Burden v Burden, 159 
NY 287, 308). They may not seek to substitute their judgment or that of 
the court for the judgment of the directors (see Kalmanash v Smith, 
291 NY 142, 155). 
 
It is therefore proposed that, 
 
Proposition 3b: In a mediating board, interference by the stakeholders 
(including shareholders) in the board’s decision-making process will 




Trust is a concept which is clearly absent under the agency theory and the monitoring 
board model. The crux of agency theory is built upon distrust: distrust as to whether 
the managers will pursue the principals’ interests and not opportunistically increase 
their own utility and distrust that the directors will carry out their monitoring role 
properly without colluding with the managers at the expense of the principals (Davis, 




Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). As such, the whole corporate governance system is 
centered on the notion of control and interest alignment.  
 
On the other hand, as discussed, one of the important incentives under the mediating 
board is the internalized trustworthiness of the board. The directors under the team 
production model are therefore motivated not only by the extrinsic compensation 
package but also by the association with the trustworthiness that is inherent in the 
status. As Blair and Stout argue, this internalized trustworthiness of the board is the 
keystone that sets fiduciary relationship apart from contractual relationship in law 
(Blair & Stout, 2001b).  
 
The legal foundations of trust and trustworthiness in corporate law have been 
extensively dealt with by Blair and Stout in their 2001 paper and will not be repeated 
here. I will however like to reiterate two points they made.  
 
First, corporate law sets directors apart from mere managers by making them 
fiduciaries of the firm and not agents of the shareholders. The legal duties of loyalty 
and care are imposed by virtue of the position of the fiduciary and not by contractual 
means. A person who accepts to become a fiduciary in law must single-mindedly 
pursue the interests of his/her beneficiary (Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30), 
even when the latter cannot monitor or control the fiduciary’s behavior (Blair & Stout, 
2001b; Clark, 1985). If the fiduciary fails in his/her job, the courts condemn him/her 
in terms that are “didactic and full of moral fervor” (Blair & Stout, 2001b:1783; Clark, 




1985; Frankel, 1983). Fiduciary duty law thus acts by shaping and reinforcing social 
norms of careful and loyal behavior rather than by threatening liability (Eisenberg, 
1999b; Rock, 1997).  
 
Second, the social norms of careful and loyal behavior sanctioned by law are 
internalized by directors through social framing. They form the bases for the 
internalized trustworthiness of the board. As Blair and Stout (2001b:1796) write 
 
Corporate case law accordingly can encourage corporate participants 
to internalize norms of cooperation through social framing -- 
providing information about the social context of relationships within 
the firm. Judicial opinions unambiguously communicate that directors 
are fiduciaries and that fiduciary relationships call for trustworthy 
(loyal and careful) behavior. Corporate directors internalize this norm 
when they respond to the social signal by adopting the other-regarding 
preference function that is the hallmark of trust-based relationships. In 
other words, fiduciary duty law works through framing, not shaming. 
  
Blair and Stout suggest that there is a set of “information content” associated with the 
label “directors” (2001b:1787). People assume directors to act or perform in a certain 
way as fiduciaries, e.g., they will put the firm’s interests ahead of theirs.  
 




While Blair and Stout have dealt with the legal and sociological aspects of trust, they 
did not explore the management implications of the concept. I hope to extend the 
concept of internalized trustworthiness of the mediating board by putting it within the 
context of the organizational trust model developed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 
in their 1995 paper published in the Academy of Management Review. This will 
enable us to have a better understanding of the factors affecting the internalized 
trustworthiness of the board and examine how this internalized trustworthiness can be 
an incentive to help to improve board performance in its mediating role. For the sake 
of the discussion that follows, “trustor” is defined as the person or body who trusts 
the other party and “trustee” as the person or body who is trusted by the trustor. 
 
In their paper, Mayer et al (1995) suggest that trustworthiness of an individual or a 
body has two aspects – an objective aspect which comprises of the “motivation (or 
lack thereof) to lie” (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Mayer et al, 1995:716) and a 
subjective aspect depending on the trustor’s expectation of how the trustee will 
behave, based on the trustee’s current and previous implicit and explicit claims (Good, 
1988; Lieberman, 1981). Based on previous literature, they therefore come up with 
three major factors that contribute to the trustworthiness of an individual or body in 
an organizational relationship. These factors are ability, benevolence and integrity. 
They contend that each of these factors contributes a “unique perspective from which 
to consider the trustee, while the set provides a solid and parsimonious foundation for 
the empirical study of trust for another party” (Mayer et al, 1995:717). The next few 
sections will explore how these factors may be applied to directors and the board. 






Mayer et al (1995: 717) define ability as “that group of skills, competencies, and 
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain”. 
The reference to domain is necessary as Mayer et al point out that a trustee may be 
highly competent in one area while being deficient in another. For instance, a lawyer 
appointed as a board member may be trusted to advise the board on regulatory 
matters but may not be trusted to lead an audit committee simply because he/she may 
not possess the necessary financial skills.  
 
In addition, skills and competencies are not limited to technical or functional 
expertise but include soft skills such as interpersonal competence, business sense and 
judgment (Gabarro, 1978). A professor who has had numerous publications in top-tier 
research journals but has “never set foot inside a real business, except as a customer” 
(Bennis, & O’Toole, 2005) may have good analytical skills and thus be able to give 
sound advice in board’s decision-making. However, he may not be relied upon when 
the issue calls for the application of business sense and judgment (Bennis, & O’Toole, 
2005).  
 
A related point to this would be that the presence or absence of some skills can be 
objectively ascertained, e.g. certifications or degrees confirming technical 
qualifications. Other skills such as interpersonal competence, business sense and 
judgment are more subjective and will require proxies such as prior work experience, 




track record and testimonials to help to establish their presence. As such, disclosure 
of a prospective director’s curriculum vitae and other relevant information during the 
board’s selection process is important as it not only signals that the selection process 
is transparent but also helps to instill trust in the board. Whether the board is 
perceived to be trustworthy in carrying out its role will depend on the collective 
ability of the individual directors chosen to the board. 
 
Proposition 4a: In a mediating board, the collective ability of the 




Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good for the 
trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive. Mayer et al suggest a special 
relationship between the trustee and the trustor such that the trustee is attached to the 
trustor and want to help the latter (1995: 719). They give the example of a mentor 
(trustee) and a protégé (trustor) where the mentor will help the protégé, even though 
the mentor is not required to be helpful, and there is no extrinsic reward for the 
mentor. 
 
However, it is contended that in the context of the board, it is the position of the 
board that gives rise to the perception of empathy and sensitivity towards the need of 
the firm as a whole rather than the presence of any special personal relationship 




between the directors and any team member. As the legal basis underlining duties of 
loyalty and care of fiduciary shows, through social framing by the case law and the 
courts, people have come to accept that a corporate board as fiduciary of the firm’s 
assets will act in good faith and will put the interests of the firm before theirs. This is 
especially when the courts have defined “good faith” based on social norms that can 
be easily understood and accepted by any man in the street. Chancellor Allen said in 
the case In re RJR Nabisco (1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9: 46), an action by a director is 
not in good faith if it is based on “any human emotion [that] may cause a director to 
place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation” 
including “[g]reed, … hatred, lust, envy, revenge, … shame or pride”. This 
interaction of legal rules and social norms stresses the importance of the norm and 
increases both the likelihood that the norm will be internalized and the reputational 
penalties for violating the norm (Eisenberg, 1999b). The end result is that the 
directors believe this norm-rule when they accept their appointment as directors.  
 
Institutional theory suggests that organizational legitimacy is paramount for firm 
performance and survival (Barringer, & Milkovich, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1988). To gain 
legitimacy, organizations respond to institutional forces emanating from their social 
environment (DiMaggio, & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995), such that organizational 
practices can become “infused with value beyond the technical requirements at hand” 
(Selznick, 1957:17) and can be adopted for the sake of legitimacy rather than 
improved performance (DiMaggio, & Powell, 1983). Therefore, the perception of the 
board of its own legitimacy is shaped by what the external institutions, e.g. public, 




suppliers of capital, consumers and regulatory agencies etc. view as legitimate, i.e. 
whether they will endorse the actions of the board. All these external institutions will 
expect the board to act in the best interests of the firm.   
 
The conclusion is, whether by social framing or by organizational legitimacy, the 
directors will internalize the norm of acting in the best interests of the firm (Blair & 
Stout, 2001b) and in this regard the board is believed by the team members to have 
good intentions toward the firm as a whole. 
 
Proposition 4b: In a mediating board, the benevolence of the board 
will affect the internalized trustworthiness of the board.  
 
3.7.3 Integrity 
Integrity is defined as “the trustor’s perception that the trustee adhere to a set of 
principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al, 1995: 719). This construct of 
value congruence is important as trust is relational and the acceptability by the trustor 
of the set of principles that the trustee follows is a precursor to whether the trustee can 
be trusted (McFall, 1987; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Mayer et al (1995) suggest that issues 
to corroborate a trustee’s integrity would include proofs of consistency of the 
trustee’s past actions, credible communications about the trustee from other parties, 
belief that the trustee has a strong sense of justice and the extent to which the party’s 
actions are congruent with his or her words. Therefore, with respect to directors, these 




reinforce the point that trustworthiness of the board will increase with the disclosure 
of positive information about the directors.  
 
However, the perception of the trustee’s integrity by the trustor can vary over time. 
This will depend on whether the trustee’s integrity is supported by the new 
information obtained through third-party sources and observation. Although the best 
way to confirm the integrity of a trustee is to have first-hand information with which 
to judge his actions, most of the time shareholders and other team members have no 
way of determining what transpires behind the boardroom’s closed doors when the 
board carries out its functions until the firm’s financial performance is disclosed a 
year later.  In the absence of inside data, outward indicators such as board policies 
and charters become important proxies for assessing the integrity of the board (Useem, 
2003). Board policies and charters shape the quality and timeliness of the board’s 
decisions. Good board policies and charters should be comprehensive to incorporate 
the latest requirements laid down by the relevant regulatory authorities such as full 
disclosure, independent audit, compensation and nomination committees, and either 
separation of chair from the chief executive or appointment of a lead director if not 
(Useem, 2003). These board policies, which are usually open documents for viewing 
by the interested parties, will provide the minimum assurance to team members that 
the directors are guided by a set of acceptable and unbiased principles when making 
decisions and resolving critical challenges, regardless of how many directors and who 
they are.  To summarize the above discussion, the following proposition is proposed. 
 




Proposition 4c: In a mediating board, the integrity of the board will 
affect the internalized trustworthiness of the board.  
 
3.7.4 Internalized Trust as a Determinant of Board Effectiveness 
As it has been shown above, law and legal environments play an important part in 
institutionalism as they give meaning to organizations as social constructs (Scott, 
1994). Organizations adopt certain structures and practices because the socio-legal 
environment constructs those structures and practices as proper, responsible, 
legitimate and natural (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). This goes beyond seeing law as 
shaping organizational behavior by creating incentives and penalties. Therefore, the 
condoning or the adverse attitudes of the law towards certain organizational behavior 
will over time result in the organizations reflecting the enduring rules that are 
institutionalized and legitimized by such social environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995).  
 
With respect to directors’ duty of care and duty of loyalty to the firm, many legal 
scholars have argued that the directors can be motivated to comply both by the desire 
to avoid liability as well as by social norms (Eisenberg, 1999b; Rock, 1997). 
Compliance with social norms, in particular, can give legitimacy to the board which 
is important for its survival. Social norms have clearly shown to expect the board to 
be trustworthy and act in a good faith manner towards the firm as a whole under its 
care. Given the need for survival, the board will continue to ensure that its 
performance meet the duties entrusted upon it and the standard of care and loyalty 




perceived by the society at any given point in time. This can be shown by the fact that 
boards by and large have become more efficient and active in the last twenty years 
than before (Eisenberg, 1999b; Rindova, 1999) because of the greater expectations 
imposed on it by the society and the law. Therefore, internalized trustworthiness of 
the board, like the board prestige that has been discussed, has a self-reinforcing effect; 
i.e. by proving to its team members and the society that it can be trusted, the team 
members will continue to trust in it as an efficient mediator of the firm’s assets and 
remain in the team. This will in turn enhance the board’s trustworthiness and improve 
firm performance. On the other hand, once the board breaches its internalized 
trustworthiness by acting in a way which is inconsistent with the rules and social 
norms, the board will lose its team members and the production will halt. This can be 
very costly for the directors as it will affect their self-prestige and their prospect of 
joining future boards.   
 
Proposition 5: In a mediating board, the internalized trustworthiness 
of the board will affect board effectiveness.  
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
By introducing Blair and Stout’s team production theory of the firm and the 
mediating board model, I hope to bring in an alternative way of examining the 
corporate governance structure of the firm. The team production theory is a new but 
compelling model of corporate governance that is still in the early stages of 




development (Kostant, 2002). Nevertheless, it has already gained a lot of attention in 
the academic circle. This is due to a few reasons (Kostant, 2002). 
 
First, it was conceived at a time when scholars are searching for new theories to 
explain the firm. The spat of corporate scandals in the last few years in the US have 
raised doubts as to whether agency theory and related models are the appropriate 
knowledge that should be imparted to students. Both the media and the academic 
circle have posited a cause and effect relationship between the teaching of agency 
theory and the rise of these corporate scandals (Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal, & Moran, 
1996; Madrick, 2003; Pfeffer, 2005; Skapinker, 2005). Even though some have 
doubted whether the downfalls of firms could really be attributed to the teaching of 
agency theory and propagating shareholder value – “For then, all we have to do is 
change our theories and social behavior would change!” (Mintzberg, 2005:108) – the 
labeling of agency theory as “bad management theory” (Ghoshal, 2005:75), 
“harmful” (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996:12), “bad for practice” (Pfeffer, 2005:96) and 
linking it with “scandals and misbehavior” (Pfeffer, 2005), “troubling era” (Gapper, 
2005: 101) etc. have prompted many scholars to try to develop new theories.  
 
Therefore, when the team production theory is touted as a model that “protect(s) the 
corporate coalition”, “serves the interest of the corporation as a whole” (Blair & Stout, 
1999:321-322) and promises to restore trust into intra-organizational relationships 
(Blair & Stout, 2001b), the media review of the model has been good (Anonymous, 
2004; London, 2002). The Sloan Foundation in 1999 even awarded a 2.2 million 




grant for a period of three years to support research, seminars, conferences, 
workshops, and the publication of books, monographs, and journal articles relating to 
the theme (Rickun, 1999). Blair and Stout have also been actively promoting the 
model to the public by setting up a website at 
http://www.teamproduction.us/index.htm and explaining their theory in simple 
language for the masses. It can be argued that team production theory and the 
mediating board emerged at a time when the public and the academics are eager to 
find a weighty competing theory to rival the agency theory and the monitoring board. 
 
Second, the team production model is grounded in law and economics. It has been 
said that Blair and Stout’s effective use of the same conceptual apparatus that has 
been relied on by the proponents of the agency model allow them to challenge some 
of the issues head-on and to gain wider acceptance than the previous models in a 
research area where the law-and-economics approach dictates (Millon, 2000). This 
also explains the amount of interest they have generated in legal literature since the 
publication of the series of articles. The model have already spawned a number of 
articles that apply the director primacy model to case law (Hanewicz, 2004) or 
employ the mediating hierarch model to examine a variety of corporate law problems 
(e.g. see Butler, 1999; Meurer, 2004; Mitchell, 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, the team production theory is not perfect. It has its shortcomings 
(Meese,  2002; Millon, 2000) and it is still constantly being refined and debated. It is 
hoped that this essay can contribute to this growing body of literature on team 




production theory. In addition, it is also the aim of this essay to excite management 
researchers to examine and comment on the team production theory and its mediating 
hierarch board model. For that reason, I have contrasted the team production theory 
with the prevailing agency theory and explain how the mediating board differs from 
the monitoring board. I suggest that the board as a mediating hierarch complements 
the other two board roles, namely service/strategic and resource-gathering functions, 
much better than the monitoring board does.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I have constructed a model of determinants of an 
effective mediating board. It is argued that the purpose of a mediating board is very 
different from that of a monitoring board and therefore the performance measures and 
incentives scheme are different as well. Contrary to what Blair and Stout has 
suggested, I contend that the directors’ compensation should not be a flat fee but 
should contain some variable components to motivate the directors. The variable 
components should be tied to the outcome of the board’s performance, i.e. firm 
performance in a broader sense that takes into account of not only the shareholders’ 
investments but also the creditors and other contributors’ interests as well, and the 
satisfaction level of the various team members of the firm.  
 
It is also contended that board’s composition can play a big part to encourage the 
board to act as a mediator and to improve its performance. In particular, the diversity 
of the board will persuade it to adopt a broader view that will consider competing 
interests rather than a narrow view that looks only to shareholders’ interests. In 




addition, I argue that board prestige enhanced by the diverse board in terms of 
resources and representation can act like a “magnet” to bring other prestigious people 
to join the board and enhance firm performance. However, there are also certain 
dangers embedded in a diverse board that can threaten the independence and 
efficiency of the board. It is suggested that disclosure and increase transparency are 
still required under the mediating board but they should be approached with caution 
so as not to stifle the board in its decision making process. 
 
Finally, the essay demonstrates that the internalized trustworthiness of the board is an 
important determinant for an effective mediating board. I look at the factors affecting 
trustworthiness, i.e. ability, benevolence and integrity and suggest that legal rules 
coupled with social norms can be very powerful in persuading the directors to act in 
the best interests of the firm. 
 
3.9 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The future research potential in this area is vast. First, more fine-grained analyses are 
needed, such as the workings and processes of a mediating board. As has been 
pointed out, the board of directors as a mediating hierarch can play an important part 
in allocating corporate resources amongst various competing constituents as a matter 
of output rather than input. The challenge is therefore to devise a framework or a 
system of prioritization to assist directors to make choices among competing interests 
in these circumstances (Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, & Schipani, 2002). Although not all 
members of the team will receive equal or fair shares of the surplus generated, they 




are at least to be compensated a modest premium over their opportunity cost (Blair & 
Stout, 1999:282). A possible staring point may be to look at how “team-specific” is 
the contribution by a particular team member. If the asset is very “team specific”, i.e. 
it can only be used in the team and cannot be easily withdrawn from the team and 
sold for their full value elsewhere (Stout, 2003), then the interests of the contributor 
should be given a higher priority as compared to those of a contributor who can easily 
withdraw his/her investment.  
 
Second, more research can be done to examine the behavior of the board with 
increasing diverse representation. So far, most of the works that have written on the 
team production theory and the mediating board assume that the board is a cohesive 
whole and can work together single-mindedly to resolve competing issues. However, 
as argued above, the board will be more efficient as a mediator if there are different 
representations on board who are able to alert the board as to the backgrounds and 
synergies of the various team members. Yet problems can be foreseen when there are 
different “cooks” who each would like to create his/her own dish. Therefore, what are 
the interactions among the board members and how to curb power-play in order that 
the board can act cohesively will be important topics for future studies.   
 
Finally, under the team production theory, the director is at the pinnacle of the 
corporate governance structure and acts as the fiduciary of the firm with almost 
uninhibited discretion, except occasional sanctions from the court. Although we agree 
with Eisenberg (1999b) and Rock (1997) that social norms play a big role in shaping 




and encouraging honest and loyal behaviors, these social norms cannot act alone. The 
social norms concerning the duties of loyalty and care of fiduciary must operate in a 
field that is within the scope of the law (Eisenberg, 1999b). Therefore, the law needs 
at least to define the scope of permissible conduct and to pronounce what is not 
permitted. As many scholars have pointed out (Blair & Stout, 1999; Clark, 1985; 
Eisenberg, 1999b), the law concerning directors’ duty of loyalty and care tends to be 
fuzzy at the edges and therefore can change over time. Nonetheless, it will be 
beneficial to existing directors and potential ones to have a set of timely guidelines as 
to the tolerance level of the courts. These rules will guide them in assessing 
competing interests and in deciding controversial issues such as when risk-taking on 
behalf of the firm becomes a bane than a boon. Therefore, legal and management 
scholars can continue to work together to help in the formulation and dissemination 
of the knowledge in this area.  





LITIGATING CHALLENGES TO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES  
– AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Civil lawsuits against the corporate boards for breach of their duties owed to the 
corporations have been one of the most understudied topics in corporate 
governance research. Comments on the effect of litigation as a check on 
managerial misconduct have been mixed. On one hand, it is clear that the number 
of lawsuits against corporate directors has increased dramatically over the years 
and is the main reason behind the escalating premiums paid by corporations for 
directors and officers (D&O) insurance (Weinberg, 2002). On the other hand, 
some researchers are skeptical as to the effectiveness it plays as an instrument of 
corporate governance (Bainbridge, 2002c; Bhagat & Romano, 2002; Romano; 
1991).  
 
While there has been research to look at the wealth effect and reduction of agency 
costs arising from these litigations, few studies have looked into the factors that 
can affect the outcome of the litigation. This is important as litigation is generally 
costly and the beneficiary may not always be the corporation but the 
entrepreneurial lawyers (Romano, 1991). It is not a priori clear why some 
plaintiffs win the suits and others do not. Therefore, an understanding of the 
factors that contribute to winning will give directors and corporate executives a 
balanced view and a better knowledge of the liability risk they are facing and help 





actions in court. It will also enable the management to evaluate what are the 
common minefields that should be avoided. To the shareholders, especially 
institutional investors, such a study will help them to evaluate whether litigation is 
a practical form of governance mechanism. Finally, since the directors’ duties of 
care and loyalty to the firm exist under the common law and are not statutorily 
imposed legal obligations, an empirical study comprising of court decisions made 
over a period of ten years will be useful to the courts and the policy makers to 
gauge whether the result is what they have intended and if not, to consider 
possible changes via legislation.     
 
This study examines a sample of 185 US cases where the directors have been 
taken to court for breaches of duty to the corporation obtained from publicly 
available data over a ten-year period. Unlike similar previous studies conducted 
by Thomas & Martin (2001), Thompson & Thomas (2004a) and Thompson & 
Thomas (2004b), the scope covered by this study is wider as it is not confined to 
only looking at litigating challenges to executive pay (Thomas & Martin, 2001) or 
acquisition-oriented class actions (Thompson & Thomas, 2004a). The study also 
covers decisions arising from both Delaware and non-Delaware states. The data 
shows that the plaintiffs are successful under some circumstances in a significant 
percentage of these cases. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the plaintiffs almost 
always lose if the case goes to court (Bainbridge, 2002c). 
 
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part of this chapter looks at some 
of the factors that can affect the outcome of the litigation taken to enforce 





description of the method used and the sample selection. The third part analyses 
the data and discusses some of the findings. The fourth part looks at the policy 
implications from the discussion and suggests possible future research directions 
in this area.  
 
4.2 FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF LITIGATION 
There are various factors that can affect the outcome of a court case. These factors 
include judicial policy preferences (Revesz, 1997), the presiding judge’s political 
affiliation (Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, 1999), legal expertise (Thompson & 
Thomas, 2004a, b) and other factors that are important to the subject matter of the 
case or have a doctrinal impact on the case. Our study focuses on some of the 
factors observable directly from the cases that may affect the outcome of litigation 
against directors for breach of their duties to the firm. These factors can be 
broadly classified as: 1) identity of the plaintiff or the initiator of the suit; 2) type 
of breaches of duty alleged; 3) whether the director(s) personally benefited from 
the underlying transaction; and 3) nature of the firm, i.e. whether it is a public or 
close corporation.  
 
4.2.1 Identity of the Plaintiff or the Initiator of the Suit 
First, the party who commences proceedings to enforce the wrongs done to the 
company can affect the outcome of the case. Unlike in a direct or class action 
where the plaintiff is definitely the shareholders who have been directly injured by 
the actions of the directors or officers, the plaintiff in a lawsuit to enforce 





personality is only a legal fiction or artifice and it must personify and work 
through human medium.  
 
In general, the right to bring lawsuit on behalf of the firm is vested in the 
corporate board as part of their managerial power (Palmiter, 2003). That said, 
directors involved in wrongdoing are intuitively unlikely to bring actions against 
themselves and even where those in breach of duty are in a minority position, 
board dynamics will still create a reluctance to sue (Parkinson, 1993).The 
responsibility to sue will next fall on the majority shareholders, especially 
following a takeover. Nonetheless, it is the minority shareholders who do not have 
very much say in the election of the board and so are unlikely to collude with the 
directors that are likely to be actively involved in corporate litigation against the 
directors (Hutchison, 2001).  
 
Whether the action is taken by the majority or the minority shareholders, the suit 
will be known as derivative action, i.e. the cause of action belongs to the 
corporation as an entity and the shareholder is merely acting as the firm’s 
representative (Bainbridge, 2002c). Derivative litigation is generally frowned 
upon by the courts as it requires the court to balance the competing policies of 
deference to the board’s decisionmaking authority and the need to ensure 
directorial accountability. Derivative litigation brought by minority shareholders 
in addition suffers from the courts’ distaste for strike suits (Cohen v Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., (1949) 337 US 541). Strike suits are lawsuits based on no bona 






Parkinson (1993) also cites information asymmetry as one of the major obstacles 
for shareholders in a derivative litigation because it would be a formidable task for 
activist shareholders to gather necessary materials to build a case against the 
directors, since the directors would be the ones most familiar with the matter in 
question. Therefore, it has been predicted that in a derivative litigation, the 
shareholder-plaintiff “almost always lose” (Bainbridge, 2002c: 403) and this has 
some empirical support (Romano, 1991). The following hypothesis is therefore 
formulated for testing. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of 
success if the action is initiated by the board than if the action is 
initiated by the majority shareholders or the minority shareholders.  
 
4.2.2 Type of Breaches of Duties 
The other factor that can affect the outcome of the case is the head of action cited, 
that is, what kind of directors’ duties has been breached. The directors’ fiduciary 
duty has two components: the duty of care, which requires the exercise of 
reasonable skill, diligence, and care in taking (or refraining to take) board action; 
and the duty of loyalty, which requires fairness (or disclosure and approval by 
either disinterested board members or shareholders) in self-interested transactions. 
While the duty of care looks at the attentiveness and prudence of directors in 
performing their decision-making and supervisory functions, the duty of loyalty 
expects directors to put the corporation’s interests ahead of their own – a sort of 
mandatory altruism (Palmiter, 2003). Therefore, breaches of duty of loyalty 





and conflict of interests. In particular, the focus of conflict of interests is on 
misappropriation or diversion of corporate assets, opportunities, or information for 
personal gain. The various heads of diversions as adapted from Palmiter’s 
Corporations (2003:190) are as follows: 
 
1) self-dealing, where a director enters into a transaction with the 
corporation on unfair terms;  
2) entrenchment, where a director uses the corporate governance 
machinery to protect his incumbency and effectively diverts control 
from the shareholders at large to himself 
3) excessive executive compensation, where a director sells his executive 
services to the corporation for a compensation exceeding the fair value 
of his services; 
4) selling out, whereby a director accepts a bribe to sell his corporate 
office; 
5) usurping corporate opportunity, where a director seizes for himself a 
desirable business opportunity that the corporation likely would have 
taken and profited from; 
6) flagrant diversion, where a director simply steals tangible corporate 
assets or wasting corporate assets; 
7) false or deceptive disclosure of information to shareholders such as to 
undermine corporate credibility and transparency; and 
8) trading on inside information, where a director in possession of 





the corporation shares and diverts to himself a gain that may be seen as 
belonging to the corporation. 
 
It has been said that the burden on the plaintiff is higher in the duty of care than 
the duty of loyalty context, as the business judgment rule, which presumes 
reasonable diligence and good faith, shields the board in such cases (Palmiter, 
2003; Romano, 1991). This means that it is more difficult for a plaintiff to succeed 
in duty of care cases than in duty of loyalty cases.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of 
success if the action involves breaches of duty of loyalty than if the 
action involves breaches of duty of care.  
 
4.2.3 Benefits Received 
Another factor that may affect the outcome of the case is whether the director(s) 
concerned has allegedly benefited from the underlying transaction. There can be 
instances where a director has alleged to have breached his duty even though the 
plaintiff cannot prove that the director has received any benefit from the 
underlying transaction. For example, the directors may have performed an action 
not in good faith or even made a good-faith board decision imprudently or without 
a rational basis. The court can find that the directors’ action do not warrant the 
protection of the business judgment rule and hold the directors liable.  
 
The Smith v Van Gorkom, (1985) 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), case is a classic 





Trans Union Corporation liable for not informing themselves adequately when 
they approved the sale of the company in a negotiated merger. This was despite 
the fact that the directors involved were not alleged to have benefited from the 
transaction concerned. However, the effect of the Smith v Van Gorkom has been 
watered down by Delaware and most other states enacting exculpation statutes 
that authorize charter amendments shielding directors from personal liability for 
breaching their duty if there are no financial benefits or personal benefits. 
Therefore, whether the plaintiff can prove that the errant director has received 
some form of benefit can have a bearing on the outcome of the litigation. 
 
In addition, Blair and Stout (1999) have suggested that although the idea of “duty 
of loyalty” sounds broad, in practice, the law has interpreted the duty very 
narrowly. Therefore, a director is only held liable in the most obvious and 
egregious kind such as when he obtains personal benefits at the expense of the 
firm, for instance, where he reaps profits from personal business ventures that 
either are in the same line of business as the firm’s, or became available to him 
because of his corporate position. However, they also suggest that the court will 
not hold the directors liable in circumstances where directors make strategic 
business decisions that provide non-monetary benefits to themselves at 
shareholders’ expense. They give two examples of what they term “mixed 
motives” (Blair & Stout, 1999: 299): where the directors use firm funds to build a 
lavish headquarters, or to make donations to their favorite charities. In other words, 
whether the director has received monetary or non-monetary benefits may have an 







Hypothesis 3: The plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of 
success if the director has received benefits from the underlying 
transaction as compared to a case where the director did not 
receive any benefit or no benefit has been specified.  
 
4.2.4 Nature of Corporation 
Finally, whether a plaintiff will win in his claim against the director can also 
depend on the nature of the firm, i.e. whether the firm in question is a public 
corporation or a close corporation. In the US public corporations with dispersed 
ownership structures, there are market controls, independent directors and other 
checks on corporate misconduct and so litigation may not be a vital part of public 
corporation shareholder monitoring. However, for a close corporation where such 
controls are absent, litigation may be the only checks on managerial opportunism 
and therefore the courts may be more sympathetic towards the plaintiffs in 
granting relief. This has some support in prior research which has shown that the 
plaintiff has a higher success rate in litigation challenging executive pay if the 
firm involved is a closely-held corporation regardless whether the case arises in 
Delaware courts or non-Delaware courts (Thomas & Martin, 2001). However, in 
another study by Thompson and Thomas (2004b) on derivative lawsuits arising 
from Delaware, it was found that few derivate suits are filed against private firms, 
and only a small fraction of these suits result in any relief for the plaintiffs. This 






Hypothesis 4: The plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of 
success if the corporation concerned is a close or private 
corporation as compared to a case where the corporation is a 
public corporation.  
 
4.3 METHOD AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
4.3.1 Content Analysis 
For this study, it is important to use a method to examine decided cases and to 
enumerate how often an action against directors for breach of directors’ duties is 
initiated by the various possible parties, the type of breach alleged and the 
outcome of the cases as decided by the courts. Content analysis was chosen to 
achieve these objectives. Content analysis is “an observational research method 
that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of 
recorded communications” (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991) and it is the best at providing 
“a scientific, quantitative, and generalizable description of communication 
content” (Kassarjian, 1977:10). It is a popular methodology that has been tried and 
used in political science, journalism, social psychology, communication research 
and political propaganda analysis (Kassarjian, 1977).  
In empirical legal research, content analysis is one of the three major forms of 
methodology commonly employed, the other two being descriptive data obtained 
using a survey instrument and time-series modeling (Heise, 1999). Content 
analysis of decisions of the court or characterizing judicial opinions on the basis 





First, it can be used to examine the case-reporting process, for example, the 
criteria used by the courts in determining whether or not a judicial opinion should 
be published in law reports (Songer, Smith, & Sheehan, 1989). Second, it can be 
employed to study the judicial decision-making process and the role of judges’ 
social background (for example, his or her political party affiliation: Brudney, 
Schiavoni & Merritt, 1999; Revesz, 1997) or personal attributes, such as gender 
(Gruhl, Spohn & Welch, 1981; Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 1988) and race (Uhlman, 
1978; Welch, Combs & Gruhl, 1988) on judicial decisions. Some data not directly 
observable from the judicial opinions may be required, e.g. the political party 
affiliation of the judge in question, to compliment such kinds of study.  
Third, content analysis has also been used to examine the outcomes of judicial 
decisions, for instance, the sentencing scheme for first-degree murder, to allow the 
researcher to make suggestions on how the legislature can adjust its scheme to 
promote consistency and efficiency (Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso & Christ, 2002). 
Also falling under this category of research are studies that examine the factors 
that decide the outcome of a case, e.g. whether the corporate veil is pierced or not 
(Thompson, 1991) or whether the court will decide in a plaintiff’s favor in a 
shareholder’s derivative action challenging directors’ pay (Thomas & Martin, 
2001). The present study belongs to this third kind of research. 
The use of content analysis to code judicial opinions for subsequent analyses 
benefits from certain advantages that are unique in legal research (Heise, 1999, 
2002). First, the supply of raw data, which is case law, is significant, inexhaustible 
and constantly increasing as cases are decided by the courts in every major 





the American state jurisdictions, content analysis benefits from the “natural 
laboratory provided by the heterogeneous development of the common law in fifty 
separate jurisdictions, each possessing its own legal characteristics” (1999: 825). 
Another advantage of this kind of research is that changes in common law or 
judge-made rules are rapid, unlike Acts which need some time to be heard through 
the various sittings of the parliament before they can be passed as law. As such, 
case law has the potential to impact important aspects of modern life (Heise, 1999: 
835) and shape the actions of the actors concerned. Examining the changes in 
judicial decisions will help in generating broader policy issues. 
 
4.3.2 Sample Selection 
This study examines the US state court judgments involving directors’ breach of 
duty for the last ten years from January 1 1993 through to January 1 2003.  
Federal cases were excluded because corporate law in the US is regulated mainly 
at the state level and there is no federal corporation statute (Palmer, 2003: 10). A 
study period of ten years was chosen to ensure that the study encompasses a 
database large enough to ensure statistically significant results. The cases were 
obtained from publicly available information in the Lexis.com® on-line database. 
Lexis.com® provides access to more than 30,000 titles in legal and business 
information including case law and statutes from countries such as US and the 
database is one of the two authoritative legal databases generally used in academic 
legal research and accepted in major law journals such as the University of 
Chicago Law Review (Nourse, 2001) and Stanford Law Review (Bebchuk, Coates 
& Subramanian, 2002). The other database frequently used is the Westlaw 






As the Lexis.com® database is a general database with cases sorted according to 
the country-of-origin and the jurisdictions of the courts, it was necessary to sieve 
out the appropriate cases pertaining to the present study before the cases could be 
coded for content analysis. 
 
4.3.3 Training of Coders  
Two coders were engaged to help in this project. These two coders were senior 
undergraduates. One of them was a third year business student who had attended 
an advanced law course in Corporate Law and Finance in his third year. The other 
was a final year law undergraduate who had completed his module in Company 
Law. Both had studied directors’ legal duties and liabilities in their courses and 
were familiar with the issues covered in the present study. They were asked to 
download the cases from the Lexis.com® database, sieve through the cases and 
then code the cases according to the coding scheme given to them. In order for 
them to be familiar with the sieving process, agree on the definitions and to refine 
the coding categories, data from 1/1/1992 to 1/1/1993 were used as a ‘practice set’.  
 
Following this, the cases from the actual sample were sieved and coded. Inter-
coder reliability was calculated and based on simple percentage agreement, the 
two coders had an inter-coder agreement of 97.5% for the sieving process while 
that for the coding process was 93.4%. All disagreements were settled through 
discussion among the coders after consulting with us. It is acknowledged that the 
simple percentage-agreement method of calculating inter-coder reliability in this 





form of the proportional reduction in loss (PRL) reliability measure recommended 
by Rust and Cooil (1994).    
 
4.3.4 Sieving Process 
This was conducted in three steps. First, the coders searched the database “State 
Court Cases, Combined”. This database contains all available Supreme Court, 
Courts of Appeals, selected trial and miscellaneous court decisions from all states, 
the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia (source information available on 
the Lexis.com® website). The search term used was “director AND duty of 
loyalty” using the “Terms and Connectors” mode and limiting the search by year. 
The search term was deliberately stated very widely to ensure that the words in 
string appeared together as a term in the text of the document before registering it 
as a positive result. This generated an initial number of 546 cases displayed in an 
alphabetical order according to the name of the states from which the case was 
decided. For cases from the same state, they were displayed with the highest court 
first in reverse chronological order by date of decision.  
 
Second, each case was downloaded in full and examined to eliminate “false 
positives” cases that contained the operative words but had nothing to do with 
litigation against directors for breach of duties to the firm in a corporate setting, 
excluding bankruptcy situations. A case would be rejected for any one of the 
following reasons: 
 
1. No director was named as a defendant (e.g. Disctronics Limited, et al. 





Services, Inc. v Lindsey & Newsom Claim Services, Inc., (2000) Cal. 
App. LEXIS 687, involving a vice-president who was not a director); 
 
2. Case was not initiated by the proper plaintiff for litigation against 
directors for breach of duties to the firm or when the firm concerned 
was no longer a going concern (e.g. creditors: Ayr Composition, Inc. v 
Fred Rosenberg, (1993) N.J. Super. LEXIS 1; liquidator: United 
Physicians Insurance Risk Retention Group, v Nick Belisomo, (1995) 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 662; and bankruptcy trustee: MEI Salon Corp v 
Carl R. Pohlad, (1997) Minn. App. LEXIS 257);  
 
3. Case did not involve a business corporation e.g. unincorporated 
associations, non-profit or charitable organization such as 
condominium trust (e.g. Harris v McIntyre, (2000) Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 181), real property management corporation (e.g. Sayyah v 
O'Farrell, (2001) Ohio App. LEXIS 1914), hospitals (e.g. St. Joseph's 
Regional Health Ctr. v Munos, (1996) Ark. LEXIS 629) and 
university/college (e.g. Oliver v Boston University, (2002) Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 21); 
 
4. Case involved a criminal action (e.g. The People v Roberta Rita Castro, 
(2000) Cal. App. LEXIS 187); 
 
5. Case did not involve an action against director for breach of fiduciary 





the cause of action is in the breach of employment contract: Dawson v 
Temps Plus, Inc., (1999) Ark. LEXIS 189); 
 
6. Case involved issues on procedural matters only e.g. motion for re-
argument (Havens v Attar, (1997) Del. Ch. LEXIS 147) or motion for 
leave to amend complaint (Kahn v Roberts, (1994) Del. Ch. LEXIS 33); 
 
7. Case involved a ruling on a point of law only (e.g. lower court 
submitting questions concerning interpretation of law to the higher 
court for certification etc.);  
 
8. Case had been previously coded - for cases that involved a series of 
hearings, e.g. motion, trial, appeal etc., only the decision of the final 
court or the decision dealing with the substantive issues was coded to 
ensure no duplication; and 
 
9. Case did not have a definite outcome as to who was the winner of the 
case, i.e. for instance the case was sent back to the lower court for a re-
trial (e.g. Golaman v Pogo.com Inc., (2002) Del. Ch. LEXIS 71).  
 
The third step involved repeating the above two steps by using a slightly different 
search term “director AND duty of care” and again limiting the search by year. 
This was to catch cases where the plaintiff might have sued the director on 
grounds of breach of duty of care without alleging at the same time a breach of 





However, many cases were eliminated in the process as the bulk of the cases 
involve patients suing the directors of hospitals for being vicariously liable for the 
malpractice of their doctors (e.g. Smith v Marrone, (1994) Mass. Super. LEXIS 
724; Williams v Wadsworth, (1993) Minn. LEXIS 504; Alar v Mercy Memorial 
Hospital, (1995) Mich. App. LEXIS 24, where breach of physician-patient 
privilege was alleged) and general tortious actions (e.g. Gamboa v Shaw, (1997) 
Tex. App. LEXIS 5547, action against attorney; Offshore Pipelines v Schooley, 
(1998) Tex. App. LEXIS 6377, action against former employer; Sowell v 
Resolution Trust Corp, (1996) Tex. App. LEXIS 1862, action against bank). In 
addition, the list of cases was combed through carefully to strike off any repetitive 
cases that had been captured using the search term in step one. In the end, only 
185 cases (9.7%) from the general search were included in the database for coding.  
 
4.3.5 Construction of Coding Scheme  
In this study, the focus is to examine how some factors directly observable from 
the court decisions can affect the outcome of the litigation against directors for 
breach of duties. Therefore, a coding scheme based on the discussion above was 
constructed. The variables used for coding include 1) who initiated the action; 2) 
what kind of directors’ duties had been breached; 3) whether the director(s) 
involved personally benefited from the transaction in question; 4) the nature of the 
firm, i.e. whether it is a close corporation or a public or listed corporation; and 5) 








Dependent variable.  
The outcome of the case was set as the dependent variable. Outcome was 
measured as a binary variable set equal to 1 if the defendant or the director won 
the case and to 0 otherwise. As a plaintiff can plead his case under a number of 
heads, e.g. for breach of duty of loyalty and breach of duty of care, winning for 
the plaintiff was defined as the plaintiff winning any relevant cause of action. In 
other words, a plaintiff in the study is considered as having won his case if he 
succeeded in proving his case under a breach of duty of loyalty although he might 
have lost his claim under a breach of duty of care. On the other hand, a director is 
considered as having won his case only if he managed to defend all the actions 
brought against him.  
 
Independent variables.  
The data comprised of four groups of independent variables. For the first group on 
the identity of the plaintiff, there were three categories, i.e. the board of director, 
the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders. For the second group, the 
types of breaches were divided into eight categories in accordance to the 
discussion above. For the third group on benefits, three categories were 
constructed, i.e. directors received monetary benefit, directors received non-
monetary benefit and no benefit was received. Finally, the cases were coded 
according to whether it concerned a public or close corporation. Dummy variables 
were formed to capture the information from the data that lands itself to a binary 
form. It was expected that every case studied would record only 1 positive 
response in each group, since the categories are mutually exclusive, except for the 





the plaintiff would raise more than one head of complaints to increase his chance 
of success especially when his case was weak. Therefore, in the data entry, each 
breach was treated as a separate case. The coding scheme is appended as 
Appendix I. 
 
4.4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION 
This part looks at the data collected in detail. I will first discuss the procedural 
information regarding the cases to show the coverage of the database across the 
different states. In the subsequent section, the various factors that can affect the 
outcome of the litigation against directors for breach of their duties to the firm are 
explored.   
 
4.4.1 Procedural Information Regarding the Cases in the Database 
For each case, procedural information regarding the case was gathered: the date of 
the decision; the state of origin; the citation and name of the case; and the name of 
the court which heard the case. The hearing courts are divided into three 
categories, the Court of Chancery, District Court and other first-hearing courts 
(for instance, in the state of Massachusetts, the court of first hearing for matters 
dealing with shareholders’ derivative actions is the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts at Worcester) in the first group, and the Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court and other appellate courts in the second group.  
 
Tables 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 present summary statistics about the data set used in the 
coding process. The number of cases concerning suits against directors for breach 





study, as seen from Table 4-1 below, ranging from about 10 to 24 cases per year, 
with the number of cases in 1994 being the lowest with 10 recorded cases and 
those in 1999 and 2000 being the highest with 24 cases each year. Table 4-2 
shows the distribution of cases across the states. 
 
 
Table 4-1 Distribution of Cases over the Years 
  











































Table 4-2 Distribution of Cases across the States 

















New Jersey 4 




Rhode Island 1 
South Carolina 1 









The data contained cases from 29 states. The finding that out of the 185 cases 
coded, 101 or slightly more than half (54.6 percent) originate from Delaware is 
hardly surprising since most corporations, especially the large publicly held ones, 
choose Delaware as their state of incorporation. This is consistent with the finding 
by Bebchuk and Ferrell (2002) that out of the 6,530 nonfinancial publicly traded 
corporations which have their headquarters and their incorporation in the US as 
recorded in the Compustat database at the end of 1999, 3,771 or 57.8 percent of 





designed legal infrastructure that is conducive to business: the Delaware 
legislature is a leader in corporate law reform and the Delaware corporation 
statute is intended to give management flexibility in structuring and running the 
business. All these are supported by a team of highly experienced bar specializing 
in handling corporate legal matters and an active judiciary which churns out a 
large body of case law that interprets the Delaware statute, thus providing 
certainty to corporate planners (Palmiter, 2003:40-41). With the huge number of 
corporations operating from Delaware, it is natural that the Delaware court’s 
caseload handling corporate issues is much higher than that in the rest of the states 
(Thomas & Martin, 2001).  
 
However, the number of cases actually reported and recorded is only a fraction of 
the number of cases actually filed. Due to the constraints in time and money, 
many jurisdictions have the practice of publishing only selected judicial opinions. 
In the U.S. where there are over fifty states each with their own state jurisdictions 
and court systems, there is a concern over maintaining a manageable body of law 
with the exponential growth of published opinions. Therefore, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in 1964 circulated a resolution among the 
appellate ad district courts recommending that judges limit the publication of 
opinions to those “which are of general precedential value” (Songer, Smith, & 
Sheehan, 1989: 964). This practice of selective publication has been criticized by 
many researchers (e.g. Dragich, 1995; Eloshway, 2002; Tusk, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that many cases are not published and may not be 






For instance, the 2002 Statistical Report of the Delaware Judiciary 
(Administrative Office of the Courts, Delaware, 2002) shows that there were 903 
civil cases filed with the Court of Chancery of Delaware in 2002 and 902 cases 
were disposed of by the court. However, a search in the Lexis.com® State Court, 
Combined database in the same period (i.e. from 1/1/2002 to 1/1/2003) revealed 
only 148 civil cases originating from the Court of Chancery of Delaware. This 
means that only about 16.4 percent of the cases are reported, this is not counting 
double reporting in some cases and the fact that the editors of the official law 
reports and the judges themselves have a strong say in the choice of cases to be 
reported. 
 
In addition, the reported judicial decisions also do not include all the cases on 
similar issues actually filed (since most cases are settled halfway before they are 
finally decided by the courts) or of the total number of transactions in which a 
relevant issue concerning directors’ breach of duties comes up (since many 
questions are resolved without even going to the courts) (Thompson, 1991). The 
only thing one can safely say about the results based on reported judicial decision 
is that such results are representative of cases which the courts and the judiciary in 
the particular jurisdiction deemed to have “general precedential value”, are 
important decisions that shape the common law and worthy to be included in the 
legal literature. To compensate for this limitation, a large sample of cases coded 
over a ten year period has been included in this study.    
 
Table 4-3 shows that more of the cases are decided by the courts of first hearing 





percent). This is consistent with the relative caseloads of the courts. For instance, 
the 2002 Statistical Report of the Delaware Judiciary (Administrative Office of 
the Courts, Delaware, 2002) shows that there were 903 civil cases filed with the 
Court of Chancery of Delaware in 2002 but only 715 cases filed with the Supreme 
Court of Delaware.  
 






Chancery Court/ District Court  
(high court) 101 




4.4.2 Factors Affecting the Outcome of Litigation 
Here, I investigate the possible factors that can affect whether a plaintiff wins or 
loses a case against directors for breach of duties to the corporation. Table 4-4 
presents a Spearman’s rho correlation matrix showing how the outcome is related 

















It can be seen that a plaintiff is more likely to lose if the action concerns a public 
corporation and is initiated by the minority shareholders alleging breach of duty of 
care and/or lack of good faith and the director has not received any benefit. However, 
if the case concerns a breach of conflict of interest involving bribery or excessive 
compensation and the director has received monetary benefit, the plaintiff’s 
probability of winning will increase. The next sections examine some of these factors 
in greater detail. 
 
Identity of the Plaintiff or Initiator of the litigation against directors for breach of 
duty  
As mentioned earlier, it is argued that the identity of the plaintiff or the party who 
initiates the action against director for breach of duty can have an effect on the 
outcome of the decision because of judicial prejudice against derivative actions and 
information asymmetry.  
 
In Table 4-5, a cross-tabulation of the frequency of initiation by the board of directors, 
the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders against the outcome of the 
case is presented. The chi-square test is displayed in Table 4-6. The Pearson Chi-









Table 4-5 Cross-tabulation of Initiator against Winner 
 
 





Director(s)   
Initiation Board of 
Directors 11 6 17 (9.2%)
  Majority 
Shareholders 12 6 18 (9.7%)
  Minority 
Shareholders 60 90 150 (81.1%)





Table 4-6 Chi-Square Tests of Initiator against Winner 
 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.599(a) 2 .022 
Likelihood Ratio 7.617 2 .022 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 6.413 1 .011 
N of Valid Cases 
185    
 
(a) 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.63. 
 
 
From Table 4-5, it can be seen that the overall rate of winning by the director (55.1%) 
is only slightly higher than that by the plaintiff (44.9%), contrary to the general belief 
that the plaintiff almost always loses in litigation against directors. In fact, this 
actually supports the proposition developed by Priest and Klein that there is a 
selection bias in cases selected for litigation (Priest & Klein, 1984). They claim that 
where the law is highly certain, the parties will usually be able to determine for 
themselves what the appropriate outcome of the dispute should be and can settle the 





therefore those in which there is greater uncertainty about the outcome and the 
probability of winning the case should approach fifty percent for either party.   
 
It is also found that the bulk of the litigation is initiated by the minority shareholders 
(81.1%). In a sense, minority suits provide the real mechanism by which the 
shareholders of a company can monitor by directors to their duties prescribed by law 
(Hutchison, 2001). After all, minority shareholders do not have very much say in the 
first place in the election of the board that eventually turns out to be self-serving. 
They will likely be the first to whistle-blow if they come to know about any 
misdemeanor on the part of the board. However, their relative success rate in actions 
against directors for breach of duties to the firm is less than those initiated by the 
board of directors or the majority shareholders. As a matter of fact, from the data, it 
can be seen that minority shareholders win only 40 per cent (60) of the 150 cases 
initiated by them, while the board of directors and the majority shareholders win 65 
per cent and 67 per cent respectively of their cases.  
 
Interestingly, although actions brought by majority shareholders on behalf of the firm 
are also derivative actions and so subject to the same judicial obstacles, the majority 
shareholders have a relatively greater rate of success as compared with the suits 
brought by the minority. This may indicate that information asymmetry may be a 
bigger factor in determining the chances of winning for the plaintiff. In a litigation 
initiated by the majority shareholder, the chance of success may very much depend on 





information asymmetry is a big problem for anyone other than the board itself who is 
interested in suing the board (Parkinson, 1993). If the majority shareholder also sits 
on the board or has representatives on the board, then it will be easier for him to gain 
access to crucial information, e.g. contracts showing that the directors may be 
involved in transactions contrary to the interests of the corporation, to mount a case 
against the wrongdoing directors. However, if the majority shareholder is a new 
owner who has just acquired the corporation, then it may be very difficult for him win 
the suit because of the lack of relevant information. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 that the 
plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of success if the action is initiated by the 
board than if the action is initiated by the majority shareholders or the minority 
shareholders is partially supported.  
  
Breaches of duties  
It is predicted that the plaintiff’s success rate can depend on the type of breaches 
being pleaded at trial. Table 4-7 presents the finding on this issue and Table 4-8 
provides results for the chi-square test conducted. The Pearson Chi-Square value is 











Table 4-7 Cross-tabulation of Breaches of Duties against Winner 
 
 
 WON Total 
  Plaintiff Defendant    
Breaches of 
duties 
Duty of care 13 28 41




  Duty of loyalty – not exercising 




  Duty of loyalty – conflict of 
interest – self-dealing 
 
9 4 13
  Duty of loyalty – conflict of 
interest – accepting 




  Duty of loyalty – conflict of 
interest – competing with 
firm/usurping firm’s opportunity 
 
4 9 13
  Duty of loyalty – conflict of 
interest – misappropriation of 
corporate assets, waste 
 
13 7 19
  Duty of loyalty – conflict of 
interest – insider trading, 
deceptive disclosure, and others 
 
8 10 18




Table 4-8 Chi-Square Tests of Breaches of Duties against Winner 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.960(a) 7 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 27.603 7 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 8.828 1 .003 
N of Valid Cases 
239    
 






The total number of observations recorded in Table 4-7 is 240 as the plaintiffs in 
some cases pleaded more than one breach of duty against the defendant-director. For 
instance, in Sanders v Wang and others (1999) Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, the plaintiffs, 
shareholders of Computer Associates International, Inc. ("CA"), sued CA's seven 
directors for gross negligence, corporate waste and for breach of their fiduciary duties 
by granting three of the board members, who were also the company's top executives, 
20.25 million shares of CA common stock in excess of the number authorized by the 
employee stock ownership plan. They won the case eventually and the shares were 
ordered to be returned to the corporation. The data therefore captured positive 
responses for duty of care, duty of loyalty-conflict of interest-profiting at firm’s 
expense, and duty of loyalty-conflict of interest-waste.  
 
It can be seen from Table 4-7 that the breach most commonly alleged by the plaintiffs 
is the lack of good faith on the part of the defendant, making up 94 out of the 240 
total observations. These cases quite often happen in merger situations where the 
defendants are said not to have obtained the best price for the shares transferred (e.g. 
Emerald Partners v Ronald P Berlin et al and Hall Financial Group, (1999) Del. 
LEXIS 97; In Re Lukens Inc. Shareholders Litigation, (1999) Del. Ch. LEXIS 233). 
However, the plaintiff only won in 34 per cent of the cases. Similarly, for breach of 
duty of care cases, it appears that the general perception that it is hard to win in such a 
case is supported with the plaintiff winning only 32.5 per cent of the time. On the 
other hand, in cases involving conflict of interest, the plaintiffs generally have a 





bribes/profiting at the firm’s expense/excessive compensation, or misappropriation of 
corporate assets/waste, the plaintiff won more than half the time. In this sense, 
Hypothesis 2 that the plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of success if the 
action involves breaches of duty of loyalty than if the action involves breaches of 
duty of care is supported. 
 
One possible interpretation of these results is that it is generally difficult to convince 
the court that it should find a director liable when the plaintiff cannot prove that the 
director is somehow motivated by any personal reason to breach his duty. Therefore, 
mere carelessness or failure to negotiate the best price possible is insufficient. Unlike 
the situation where there is liability when negligent driving causes a traffic accident, 
liability does not naturally arise when careless management leads to a business failure 
(Palmiter, 2003).  
 
For instance, in Salsitz v Nasser, et al. (208 F. R. D. 589), plaintiff Norman Salsitz 
initiated a shareholder derivative action on behalf of Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) 
against certain current and former directors and officers of Ford alleging that the 
latter had recklessly or intentionally breached their duty of care to Ford with regard to 
their corporate decisions made and implemented over the last 20 years. These 
decisions included wrong business decisions to modify the automobiles manufactured 
by Ford and over-purchase of certain precious materials resulting in costly write-
down and heavy losses for Ford. Even though the plaintiff managed to prove that the 





faulty engine and that the defendant also failed to track the safety record of the 
allegedly defective tires, the District Court of Michigan held that these were not 
sufficient to hold defendants liable in their personal capacities.  
 
In addition, as said, a plaintiff who alleges breach of duty of care has to cross two 
procedural hurdles: first, the business judgment rule which presumes that directors in 
performing their functions are honest and well-meaning, and that their decisions are 
informed and rationally undertaken; and second, the exculpation clauses shielding 
directors from personal liability for breaching their duty of care in some corporate 
charters. This means that it is very difficult to succeed in pleading a breach of duty of 
care alone. In fact, out of the 13 cases involving this breach which were recorded as 
being won by the plaintiffs, nine cases had other breaches cited as well.  
 
Another possible interpretation is that the court allows the directors great discretion in 
carrying out their functions, even if their decisions may not strictly benefit the 
shareholders but are in the board’s opinion, in the best interests of the firm as a whole 
(Blair & Stout, 1999). In this sense, contrary to the agency theory where the directors 
are agents of the shareholders and so should run the firm for the sole purpose of 
maximizing the shareholders’ interests (Easterbrook, & Fischel, 1991; Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen 1983), directors are regarded as guardians or trustees of the 
corporation itself (Clark, 1985; Ferran, 1999). They are the ultimate decision-making 





control or supervision by anyone, including the firm’s shareholders (Blair & Stout, 
1999).  
 
As argued by Blair & Stout (1999; 2001a), the board of directors therefore does not 
act as mere monitors to check on any misconduct by the management on behalf of the  
shareholders but is a mediating hierarch, whose job is to balance the various corporate 
constituents’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough so 
that the productive coalition of the firm stays together. The law therefore trusts that 
the board will use its best endeavors to perform its duties and will be hesitant to 
interfere with the board’s decisionmaking power unless it can clearly be shown that 
the directors have used their corporate position to harm the firm’s assets for their self-
interest.  
 
This position taken by the court is illustrated by the case of Wagner v Selinger et al., 
(2000) Del. Ch. LEXIS 1. Here, the plaintiff shareholder filed an action against the 
defendant board of directors, alleging wasted corporate assets and breached fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care, due to the board’s approval of a new separation agreement 
for the corporation’s CEO which provided better severance benefits than those agreed 
under the previous employment agreement.  
 
However, the Court of Chancery of Delaware refused to rule in the plaintiff’s favor 
just because “the Board could have struck a better bargain than the terms included in 





to gain an extra $5.2 million under the new agreement, being released from all 
potential claims the firm might have against him for past loans etc. and continued 
health benefits paid by the firm. All these were held insufficient to show “bad faith, a 
lack of honest belief that the terms were in the best interest of the company, or that 
the Board did not fully inform itself before reaching its conclusions” (at p. 13, 
emphasis mine). Therefore, it is difficult to hold that the board merely acts as a 
monitor or watchdog for the shareholders as argued under agency theory. At the very 
least, the law concerning directors’ duties to the corporation certainly does not 
support this model of the firm.   
 
Benefits  
Another factor that has been argued as important in determining the plaintiff’s 
success rate in litigation against the directors is whether the director concerned has 
benefited personally from the underlying transaction. Table 4-9 shows the frequency 
of cases in which the director(s) concerned is said to have received monetary or non-
monetary benefits or no benefit, tabulated against the outcome. Again, Table 4-10 
presents the result for the chi-square test, which shows that the Pearson Chi-Square 
value is 41.138. This is highly significant. It can therefore be said that whether the 













  WON Total 
  Plaintiff Defendant   
Benefit Yes-monetary 53 26 79
  Yes-non-monetary 17 13 30
  No 13 63 76





Table 4-10 Chi-Square Tests of Benefits against Winner 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 41.138(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 43.807 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 38.771 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
185    
 




Table 4-9 shows that in slightly more than half (58.9%) of the cases, the directors are 
alleged to have received some form of benefits. The table also indicates that in such 
cases, the plaintiff has a higher frequency of success. Hypothesis 3 that the plaintiff 
has a relatively higher frequency of success if the director has received benefits from 
the underlying transaction as compared to a case where the director did not receive 
any benefit or no benefit has been specified is therefore supported. 
 
The courts do not appear to distinguish between monetary and non-monetary benefits. 
Non-monetary benefits received by the directors in the data set would include 





purposes (e.g. Mentor Graphics Corporation v Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., (1998) 
Del Ch. LEXIS 204) or to oppress certain shareholders (e.g. Cooke v Fresh Express 
Foods Corporation, Inc., (2000) Ore. App. LEXIS 1128). Although in these cases 
there were no direct exchange of hard cash or benefits in kind, the directors stand to 
benefit by ensuring that their own positions are not threatened by the new hostile 
bidder or a disgruntled minority shareholder. Regardless of the breach alleged, the 
courts generally cannot tolerate the actions of the directors if the latter try to gain 
advantage by virtue of their positions as directors, even when doing so does not seem 
to deprive the beneficiaries of any value they would otherwise get (Clark, 1985). The 
only time they are permitted to do so is where they have made proper disclosure to 
the shareholders or in accordance with the procedures laid down in the charter or with 
explicit statutory permissions. This is in line with the utmost duty of the directors to 
put the firm’s interests before their self-interests. Therefore, the general trend shown 
by the cases in the data does not really support Blair and Stout’s proposition that the 
court is more tolerant of the directors where the benefit received is non-pecuniary.  
 
Public/Private nature of the corporation   
Our final factor looks at the nature of the firm involved in the suit. Table 4-11 shows 
the frequency of winning of the defendant and the plaintiff against the company type, 
i.e. whether the corporation concerned is a public or closely-held corporation. Table 
4-12 again shows that the difference in the winning frequency by the two parties vis-






Table 4-11 Cross-tabulation of Company Type against Winner 
 
 
 WON Total 
  Plaintiff Defendant   
Company 
Type 
Close/private 56 33 89 
  Public 27 69 96 






Table 4-12 Chi-Square Tests of Company Type against Winner 
 







Pearson Chi-Square 22.606(b) 1 .000    
Continuity 
Correction(a) 21.221 1 .000    
Likelihood Ratio 23.068 1 .000    
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 22.484 1 .000    
N of Valid Cases 185      
 
(a)  Computed only for a 2x2 table 




It can be seen that that the plaintiff tends to win more times if the corporations 
involved are closely-held corporations as opposed to public corporations. Hypothesis 
4 that the plaintiff has a relatively higher frequency of success if the corporation 
concerned is a close or private corporation as compared to a case where the 






One explanation is that the courts may be more sympathetic towards the plaintiffs in a 
closely-held corporation as the aggrieved plaintiffs do not have a ready market where 
they can simply sell their shares, exit the firm and let the new owner take over control 
of the firm by instituting a new board. Another reason may be that in closely-held 
corporations, the problem of information asymmetry is less acute and it may be easier 
for the plaintiff to gather necessary materials to mount a case against the directors. 
This can be indirectly supported by the fact that out of the 17 cases brought by the 
board of directors, 14 cases involved closely-held corporations, and out of the 18 
cases brought by the majority shareholders, 14 cases involved closely-held 
corporations. In contrast to the public corporation, there is no issue caused by the 
dispersion of shareholding inhibiting shareholder involvement in both democratic 
controls through voting and in the enforcement of the duty-based controls. The 
majority shareholders quite often are actively involved in the running of the firm and 
are closely linked to the board they elected. Some of them may even sit on the board. 
Therefore, it is easy for them to be alerted to and then to investigate and evaluate 
possible breaches by any errant director. They can also easily persuade the board to 
take up the action or even initiate action against the board if the board refuses to do so.   
  
4.4.3 Probability of the Plaintiff Winning 
Tables 13 and 14 present the estimation results to establish whether the plaintiff will 
win in a lawsuit taken against the directors for breach of duties owed to the 
corporation using a probit model. A number of factors have been controlled, 





The state of origin is an important control as it has been found that there is a 
difference between how Delaware courts treat corporate litigation such as derivative 
actions challenging board decisions on executive pay and how other courts in other 
states treat them (Thomas & Martin, 2001). I measured state with a binary variable set 
equal to “1” if the case originates from the state of Delaware and to “0” otherwise.  
 
I also included industry as a control variable. Although the same standard of care and 
loyalty applies across the board and the courts do not distinguish directors from 
different industries, corporations in the banking and financial sectors are generally 
subject to more stringent disclosure and other regulatory requirements because of the 
great amount of public funds involved. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the court 
will be more inclined to find for the plaintiff if it finds that the directors have abused 
their positions as guardians of the assets of financial institutions. This stricter 
approach can be gleaned from the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland in the case of Leavy v American Federal Savings Bank (2000) Md. App. 
LEXIS 215. In this case, the board of a bank took action against its former president 
and board chairman for making a $6.5 million loan to a troubled client and secretly 
taking a $650,000 loan brokerage fee for doing so. Adkins, J. in delivering the 
judgment for the court which found for the plaintiff bank said,  
 
“[the defendant] was president of the bank, in effect acting as … a 
loan officer, where he could put together a loan for the Bank up to the 





other people potentially to invest in [another trust loan]. I say 
influence because this is not your typical broker going out trying to 
find financing. This is a bank president and moreover a bank president 
who has shown confidence in this borrower by making a loan to the 
extent of the Bank’s legal lending limit, as big a loan as this Bank 
could make. Here was someone going to a potential investor saying … 
I’m a bank president, I think this is a good investment, our Bank is 
investing in this deal, I would like to ask you to invest in this deal …” 
 
I measured industry with a binary variable set equal to “1” if the case involves a 
financial institution and to “0” otherwise.  
 
In addition, the hearing court is included as a control variable affecting the outcome 
as it is reasonable to assume that cases with stronger merits and greater uncertainty as 
to the outcome will go on appeal considering the time and cost involved as compared 
to cases with less merit and more certain as to the outcome. In the latter situation, the 
same argument put forth by Priest and Klein (1984) applies as well, i.e. the parties 
will choose not to appeal or to settle if the case is weak or if the outcome is 
determinable. The appellate court is set as “1” and “0” otherwise.    
 
Three probit analysis models were run. The first one with the factor “benefit 
received” (comprising of the dummy variables “monetary benefits” and “no benefit” 





the variables affecting plaintiff’s winning presented in Table 4-4, it can be seen that 
the variables concerning the factor “benefit received” are highly correlated with the 
factors on the various types of breaches of duties (comprising of dummy variables 
“DC”, “FD1”, “FD2”, “FD3”, “FD4”, “FD5”, “FD6”, and FD7”) and so the results 
relating to the types of breaches may be undermined by the factor “benefit received”. 
Model 2 is presented to examine the sensitivity of the result by excluding the 
variables “monetary benefits” and “no benefit”. In the third model, I collapsed the 
various subheads of conflict of interests under the duty of loyalty into one variable to 
test the sensitivity of the model. Table 4-13 shows the results of the three models. 
 
Table 4-13 Probit Estimates of the Likelihood of Plaintiff Winning the Suit 
 
 
Dependent Variable: WON = 1 if plaintiff wins (p-values in parentheses) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Included observations: 185   
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  
C 1.091083 0.784574 0.927618  
 (0.0481)** (0.1065) (0.0880)  
Monetary benefit -0.043128  0.014009  
 (0.8872)  (0.9622)  
No benefit -1.116010  -1.150651  
 (0.0003)**  (0.0002)**  
Board initiated suit -0.187964 -0.258371 -0.191135  
 (0.7110) (0.6240) (0.6854)  
Minority initiated suit -0.329935 -0.438458 -0.190098  
 (0.3946) (0.2677) (0.6099)  
DC -0.230748 -0.402040 -0.175955  
 (0.4372) (0.1400) (0.5492)  
FD1 -0.403686 -0.321231 -0.392910  
 (0.2032) (0.2746) (0.1967)  
FD2 0.357310 0.315562 0.366769  





FD3 0.201178 0.558589 --  
 (0.6633) (0.2430)   
FD4 0.440569 0.903090 --  
 (0.2484) (0.0100)**   
FD5 -0.859396 -0.641857 --  
 (0.0829) (0.1722)   
FD6 0.259753 0.333376 --  
 (0.5615) (0.4279)   
FD7 0.227898 0.207647 --  
 (0.5902) (0.5876)   
FDC -- -- 0.069425  
   (0.8159)  
PUBLIC -0.650544 -0.762093 -0.644494  
 (0.0117)* (0.0012)** (0.0104)*  
State of Origin 0.121031 -0.067289 0.163029  
 (0.6835) (0.7991) (0.5727)  
Industry 0.408267 0.175216 0.485708  
 (0.1691) (0.5105) (0.1026)  
Courts -0.250644 -0.183671 -0.214319  
 (0.3244) (0.4378) (0.4081)  
    McFadden R-squared 0.260533 0.189436 0.227650  
H-L Statistic: 12.6168 5.3975 10.5165  
(Prob. Chi-Sq(8)) (0.1257) (0.7144) (0.2306)  
Andrews Statistic: 36.0029 12.2796 29.3250  
(Prob. Chi-Sq(10)) (0.0001) (0.2668) (0.0011)  
 






DC Duty of care 
FD1 Duty of loyalty - lack of good faith 
 
FD2 Duty of loyalty – not exercising power with proper purpose, unfair 
 
FD3 Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – self-dealing 
 
FD4 Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – accepting bribe/profiting at firm’s 
expense/excessive compensation 
 
FD5 Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – competing with firm/usurping firm’s opportunity 
 
FD6 Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – misappropriation of corporate assets, waste 
 
FD7 Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – insider trading, deceptive disclosure, and others 
 
FDC Duty of loyalty – all instances of conflict of interest  
 








In the first model, the probit analysis shows that the success rate of the plaintiff is 
negatively and significantly associated when no benefit is received by the director and 
where the corporation is publicly held. This result is consistent with the other results 
presented in the earlier part of the chapter that the plaintiff in a privately-held 
corporation has a higher chance of success in litigation against the director if the 
director has received some form of benefit from the underlying transaction.  
 
Other variables however are insignificant, although breach of duty of loyalty 
concerning usurping corporate opportunities and unfair competition (FD5) is 
marginally significant (p<0.10) and has a negative sign. This is interesting as it means 
that the likelihood of the plaintiff winning falls when the director is alleged to have 
breach this aspect of the duty of loyalty.  
 
The reason may be that in general, the US courts, unlike the courts in the UK, adopt a 
very liberal approach in interpreting what is “corporate opportunity”. The courts have 
to balance two conflicting premises, corporate expansion on one hand and manager 
entrepreneurialism on the other. Cases have shown that the courts tend to lean 
towards protecting the manager or officers with their loosely defined fairness test, i.e. 
that officers or directors will not be held liable for usurpation of corporate 







For example, in the case of Midwest Janitorial Supply Corp. v Greenwood (2001) 
Iowa Sup. LEXIS 128, the former director made preparations for a competing 
business prior to leaving the existing corporation and the Supreme Court of Iowa held 
that this alone was not actionable as a breach of fiduciary obligation as it did not 
appear that there was a discreet harm to the corporation beyond the eventual 
competition. Similarly, in Shapiro v Greenfield (2000) Md. App. LEXIS 172, the 
directors concerned formed a joint venture with the corporation to redevelop an 
underperforming corporate property. The minority shareholders took up a derivative 
suit against the directors but the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the 
case did not constitute a usurpation of corporate opportunity and even if there were 
conflicts of interest, the main question to ask was whether the transaction was fair and 
reasonable to the corporation.  
 
In the second model, the variables concerning benefits were removed in running of 
the analysis. Table 4-13 shows that the likelihood of the plaintiff winning the suit is 
positively and highly significantly associated with breach of duty of loyalty involving 
the director accepting bribe or profiting at the firm’s expense (FD4), with the 
estimates of the other variables remaining qualitatively similar. This is probably the 
most obvious and egregious kind of conflict of interest amongst all the different types 
of breaches of duty. Again, the plaintiff will most likely lose his case if it concerns a 






In the third model, the various subheads of conflict of interests under the duty of 
loyalty were collapsed into one variable to test the sensitivity of the results. The result 
is similar to that of the first model, i.e. the success rate of the plaintiff is negatively 
and significantly associated when no benefit is received by the director and where the 
corporation is publicly held. The other variables remain insignificant.  
 
Pearson x2 –type tests of goodness of fit were also performed. Comparing the three 
models, the first model has a smallest p-value for both the Hosmer-Lemeshow and 
Andrews tests and therefore can be said to be the best model of the three models. In 
addition, when one looks at Tables 4-14, 4-15 and 4-16 which display 2 x 2 tables of 
correct and incorrect classification based upon the cutoff value of 0.5, it can be seen 
that overall, the estimated model 1 has a slightly higher percentage of correct 
prediction compared to model 2. Specifically, model 1 correctly predicts 74.59 per 
cent of the observations (74.51% of the Dep=0 and 74.7% of the Dep = 1 
observations) and model 2 correctly predicts 74.05 per cent of the observations 
(85.29% of the Dep=0 and 60.24% of the Dep=1 observations). The prediction results 
for model 3 are similar to those of model 1, i.e. model 3 correctly predicts 74.59 per 










Table 4-14 Expectation-Prediction (Classification) Table on Model 1 
 
Dependent Variable: WON  = 1 if plaintiff wins (p-values in parentheses) 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5)  
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 76 21 97 102 83 185 
P(Dep=1)>C 26 62 88 0 0 0 
Total 102 83 185 102 83 185 
Correct 76 62 138 102 0 102 
% Correct 74.51 74.70 74.59 100.00 0.00 55.14 
% Incorrect 25.49 25.30 25.41 0.00 100.00 44.86 
Total Gain* -25.49 74.70 19.46    
Percent Gain** NA 74.70 43.37    
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 








Table 4-15 Expectation-Prediction (Classification) Table on Model 2 
 
Dependent Variable: WON  = 1 if plaintiff wins (p-values in parentheses) 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5)  
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 87 33 120 102 83 185 
P(Dep=1)>C 15 50 65 0 0 0 
Total 102 83 185 102 83 185 
Correct 87 50 137 102 0 102 
% Correct 85.29 60.24 74.05 100.00 0.00 55.14 
% Incorrect 14.71 39.76 25.95 0.00 100.00 44.86 
Total Gain* -14.71 60.24 18.92    
Percent Gain** NA 60.24 42.17    
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 






Table 4-16 Expectation-Prediction (Classification) Table on Model 3 
 
Dependent Variable: WON  = 1 if plaintiff wins (p-values in parentheses) 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5)  
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 75 20 95 102 83 185 
P(Dep=1)>C 27 63 90 0 0 0 
Total 102 83 185 102 83 185 
Correct 75 63 138 102 0 102 
% Correct 73.53 75.90 74.59 100.00 0.00 55.14 
% Incorrect 26.47 24.10 25.41 0.00 100.00 44.86 
Total Gain* -26.47 75.90 19.46    
Percent Gain** NA 75.90 43.37    
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
4.4.4 Limitations 
The sample collected limits our ability to address certain types of questions, which is 
inevitable in empirical research using judicial opinions (Thompson, 1991). There are 
two types of limitations that should be mentioned. First, for the various reasons as 
have been mentioned above regarding the use of reported court judgments as data, 
certain types of questions cannot be answered, such as “how frequently are the 
corporate boards being challenged regarding breaches of duties to the firm?" Many 
challenges are resolved without litigation either through informal discussions between 
the board and the company's investors, or by the plaintiff's counsel and the company 
before the plaintiff files a complaint.  
 
Also, many cases that are filed are settled without any decision by the court, or result 





can inferences be drawn about how satisfied are the complainants with the decisions 
or actions of the corporate board because we cannot observe all of the different ways 
that shareholders may express their approval or disapproval (Thomas & Martin, 2001).  
 
Another limitation of this empirical study is that the study has assumed that the same 
standards of duty of care and duty of loyalty apply throughout the different states. 
Although the broad principles are the same, there can be subtle differences among the 
state courts with different judges presiding over the cases. In addition, it is apparent 
from this study that the Delaware courts are overwhelmed by cases concerning public 
corporations while the closely held corporations tend to file their complaints in other 
states. Therefore, it is probable that the result observed can be affected by where the 
suit is brought.   
 
4.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this final section, I look at some of the policy implications arising from our 
discussion earlier. This is followed by some suggestions for future research in this 
area. 
 
4.5.1 Directors and Management 
From the empirical study, it can be seen that directors of closely held corporations 
face higher litigation risk. In addition, a director who has alleged to have obtained 





case as opposed to one who has not. However, does that mean that directors in public 
corporations can disregard their duties to the corporations as long as they are not 
involved in any transactions that yield personal benefits? For instance, can the board 
of directors of a public corporation condone the management’s involvement in 
speculative trading putting the corporation at risk at the pretence of obtaining high 
return for the corporation?  
 
Before this question is answered, it is important to clarify that the duties to the 
corporation at common law are not duties that exist in isolation. Although the 
relatively high procedural barriers to successful lawsuits to enforce directors’ duties 
to corporation somewhat limit their appeal as a regulatory mechanism, the same set of 
actions by the directors that give rise to possible breaches of duties can often result in 
federal law remedies as well (Thompson & Sale, 2003).  
 
In the example cited, the directors in addition to their duties to the corporation are 
subject to a set of comprehensive rules on timely disclosure under the federal law 
such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Under these regulations, the management and the directors will have, inter alia, to 
present and disclose true and accurate financial statements to the shareholders at each 
quarter. If the shareholders are agreeable to the speculative activities and do not raise 
any objection, they have only their own folly to blame should the corporation fall in 
the future. However, if the shareholders are not happy with what they see from the 





management. On the other hand, the board and the management cannot hide or falsify 
the statements as these actions entail heavy criminal sanctions. In this indirect way, 
the board and the management are forced to exercise their discretions with care and 
the standard is no longer solely what the directors believe those devices or strategies 
may benefit the corporation but whether such devices or strategies will equally be 
acceptable by the shareholders and the related stakeholders as well. 
 
That said, it is not correct to say that state corporate law on directors’ duties is otiose 
(Bainbridge, 2002c). As point out by Thompson and Sale (2003), state law continues 
to be important as it defines the skeleton of the corporate governance system, 
although the body of the system and the enforcement of the duties may not be 
confined to the perimeters of the state law. Further, federal law remedies need a 
“disclosure hook” (Thompson & Sale, 2003: 910) and have limited coverage in that 
they are usually targeted at directors and officers for breaches of the duty of care or 
monitoring during the day-to-day running of the corporation. The enforcement of the 
duty of loyalty remains important and effective at the state level.  
 
In addition, unlike the duty of care, breaches of duty of loyalty, especially those 
involving conflict of interests, generally involve some form of benefits to the 
directors. As it can be seen in the empirical analysis conducted in this study, the 
presence of benefit is a great determinant of liability. Directors and management 
engaging in, for example, speculative trading activities, ostensibly for the benefit of 





free if it is clear that they stand to benefit substantially because of their interests in 
share options or other form of equity pay compensation.     
 
4.5.2 Shareholders and Institutional Investors 
It cannot be denied that litigation to enforce directors’ duties is not producing 
significant monetary benefits for shareholders and institutional investors of public 
corporations. The twenty years that have followed Smith v Van Gorkom, (1985) 488 
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) have produced no fewer than 250 court decisions across many 
states that cite the Van Gorkom case (Radin, 2001). Still, it must be acknowledged 
that cases as successful for the plaintiff as the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in 
Van Gorkom are rare. The threat of litigation against directors and the result produced 
by such lawsuits are often overstated and it would be wrong for the shareholders or 
the institutional investors of public corporations to continue to believe that this is a 
viable remedy for corporate misconduct.  
 
That said, it does not mean that litigation has no corporate governance value. Such 
suit can often lead to corporate governance changes that have some beneficial effects 
for shareholders, for instance, the increase in the number of independent or outside 
directors (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). Yet, the costs of litigation may not justify the 
indirect benefits that result. 
 
Instead, it would be useful for the shareholders in public corporations to be more 





check on abuses by the board. Many recent corporate governance proposals have 
been aimed at empowering the shareholders to be more active in corporate 
governance and one example is the recent 2003 SEC Rule to allow shareholders 
access to the directors’ nomination process (Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2003, para.3d).  
 
On the other hand, shareholders of closely held corporations can continue to look to 
litigation as an important ex post solution. The costs associated with litigation in a 
closely held corporation are generally smaller than those in a public corporation   
involved because the facts are simpler in a closely held corporation and there are no 
effective procedural barriers to their litigation (Thompson & Thomas, 2004b). In 
terms of relative monetary benefits from litigation, shareholders of close corporations 
also stand to enjoy a greater portion of the recovery even though the recovery goes 
back to the firm in a derivative action because of the smaller number of shareholders 
involved.  
 
4.5.3 Policy Makers and the Courts 
It is clear from the empirical study that the courts have chosen to focus on directors as 
the fulcrum of corporate governance in public corporations (Thompson & Sales, 
2003). The positive model of the present legal regime is one which leans heavily on 
directors by giving directors full control of the management power and prefers to 
allow the markets and private ordering, as oppose to legal sanctions, to regulate how 





interference in business decisions will be kept to the minimal except in the most 
egregious breaches of duty. This can be seen by the liberal application of the business 
judgment rule that effectively shields directors from liability for all but the most 
appalling decisions.  
 
The legislatures of many states are also in favor of this position. Therefore, when the 
Delaware Supreme Court created legal inroads and expanded the realm of director 
liability in the care setting by allowing the plaintiff in the case of Smith v Van 
Gorkom, (1985) 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) to survive business judgment rule review 
solely on the grounds of gross negligence, many states rushed to enact statutes 
allowing the corporations to adopt provisions in their corporate charters to insulate 
directors for violations of their fiduciary duty of care. This undoubtedly is to 
obliterate the effect of the decision in Smith v Van Gorkom. 
 
It may be puzzling to many why the courts and the legislatures do not simply abolish 
the duty of care and declare that the directors’ duties to the corporation are confined 
only to the duty of loyalty. Legal scholars like Blair and Stout (2001b), Eisenberg 
(1999b) and Rock (1997) have argued that legal rules, especially those concerning 
duty of care, can be effective and useful, even without an enforcement strategy, 
because they clarify social norms and facilitate the effectiveness of informal sanctions 
by norm-compliers against norm violators. Lawyers, institutional investors, media 





adjustments in their conduct not so much to avoid liability but to properly perform 
their role in the eyes of the society (Eisenberg, 1999b).  
 
Even with breaches of duty of loyalty, the courts are still slow to take actions unless 
they are accompanied with charges of personal benefits to the directors. Eisenberg 
(1999b) argues that as in the case of duty of care, loyalty to a corporation is best 
achieved not by the fear of legal sanctions but by the corporate actors fully 
internalizing the social norm of loyalty and giving effect to that norm. In this way, the 
costs of both legal sanctions and monitoring would be unnecessary. This hands-off 
attitude of the law is again shared by the policy makers and the courts. Even though 
the problems caused by the separation of power and control in a public corporation 
have been pointed out as long ago as in 1932, the law concerning directors’ duties has 
hardly changed for the last 70 years. The courts have generally allowed societal 
norms to flesh out the standards required under the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty. At the same time, the federal state and the SEC help to strengthen this 
indirectly by providing substantive duties for the directors in the public corporations 
to comply with.  
  
4.5.4 Future Research 
In this study, I have confined the research to looking at how some factors directly 
observable from the decisions of the courts can affect the outcome of the case. Future 
study can look at some other extra-doctrinal factors such as judicial policy 





Schiavoni & Merritt (1999). To this end, names of the judge(s) presiding the case and 
the lawyers for both parties can be collected and analysis can be carried out to 
examine the style of judicial making by the various judges and explore whether the 
success or failure of a case involving directors’ duties is a function of judicial bias. 
Similar analysis can also be performed with lawyers since it is quite often that 
litigation lawyers have an area of specialization and the same lawyer can be 
representing different cases involving the same issue. Previous studies on lawsuits 
concerning securities fraud class actions found that a few dominant law firms 
dominate the suits (Simmons, 2002; Thompson & Sale 2003) and it is probable that 
the identity of the law firms can affect the plaintiff’s prospect of wining the case. All 
these further research will give a more holistic picture of the factors affecting the 
outcome of the cases concerning directors’ duties. 
 
In addition, one can also look at the effect of the outcome of such lawsuits on the 
securities market, particularly for public corporations. Thompson & Sale (2003) have 
shown that the mere filing of the complaints with the courts even before hearing can 
lead to a significant dip in share value with suits concerning securities fraud class 
actions. It is possible that similar pattern may be found with litigation concerning 
directors’ duties.  
 
Another area for future study is to investigate the impact of litigations on the internal 
corporate governance structure of the corporations concerned. As mentioned earlier, 





other than tangible monetary remedies from lawsuits. For instance, the corporation 
may increase the number of independent directors (Kesner & Johnson, 1990), change 
the board or put in a proper reporting procedure after a lawsuit has been brought even 
though the shareholders may have lost the suit eventually. In this sense, the objective 
of corporate governance reform is still achieved, albeit in an indirect manner.  
 
Finally, this study admittedly focuses on the cases arising in the United States and it 
may be relevant to determine how many of the cases involved juries which may be 
more susceptible to influence by the factors outlined in this study. It would also have 
been interesting to conduct a similar study of English or other commonwealth cases 
to determine if similar factors also influenced the outcome of litigation despite the 
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Please read each case carefully.  
 
Part A: Please enter the information required as fully as possible. 
 
Part B: Please record “1” for a positive observation and “0” for a negative observation. 
 
All parameters except for the “Notes” are required to be filled.    
 
 
Part A: Procedural Information 
 
CASE NO:  
 












Part B: Substantive Information 
 
1. Who took action? Initiation. Here, the party that initiated the action is defined as 
the complainant who seeks to enforce the duty of care and loyalty against the 
directors concerned.1  
 
a) Board of Directors  
b) Shareholders (shareholding 50% or more)  
c) Minority Shareholders   
 
 
                                                 
1 This qualification is necessary as some of the reported cases may be motions taken by the directors to 





2. What kind of common law has been breached? 
 
a) Duty of care  
b) Duty of loyalty - lack of good faith, not acting in the best interests of 
the firm 
 
c) Duty of loyalty – not exercising power with proper purpose; unfair 
practices  
 
d) Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – self-dealing; interest in 
company contract 
 
e) Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – accepting bribe/profiting at 
firm’s expense/excessive compensation 
 
f) Duty of loyalty – conflict of interest – competing with firm, usurping 
of corporate opportunity 
 
g) Misappropriation of company property/ waste  
h) Insider trading, deceptive disclosure and others  
 
 
3.  Did the director benefit from the alleged breach of duty? 
 
a) Yes - monetary  
b) Yes – non-monetary   
c) No or not observable from the case  
 
 
4. What is the nature of the corporation involved in the case? 
 
a) Private or close corporation  
b) Public or listed corporation  
 
 
5. Who won the case? State “1” if defendant or director won or “0” otherwise 
 
6. Is the firm concerned a financial company, e.g. bank, insurance companies etc  
 
 
Notes:  
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